Hastings Law Journal
Volume 63 | Issue 1

Article 2

12-2011

Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and
Theory
Joshua D. Sarnoff

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 Hastings L.J. 53 (2011).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol63/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

12/5/2011 11:32 PM

Sarnoff_24 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski:
History and Theory
Joshua D. Sarnoff*
The U.S. Supreme Court has continued to require that patentable subject-matter
eligibility determinations be made by reference to three historic, categorical exclusions
(scientific principles, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas), which must be treated as
if already known even when newly discovered by the applicant. Various thoughtful
scholars have alternatively urged that these exclusions should be viewed restrictively or
that such eligibility decisions should be avoided. But these scholars underappreciate the
systemic and social benefits of categorical exclusions, and particularly of treating these
categories as if they were already known prior art. In any event, the Federal Circuit, the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and the public must now draw lines between eligible
inventions and ineligible applications of excluded discoveries.
This Article supplies a history and theory of subject-matter eligibility to guide such line
drawing, based on the recognition that (for both eligibility and patentability) the Patent
Act has always required, and still requires, creative, human invention in the application
of such categorically excluded discoveries. So long as these basic discoveries continue
to be treated as if already known, relying on threshold eligibility determinations will
improve efficiency and reduce patent-system errors. Supplying clearer criteria for the
additional creativity required for eligibility will further reduce overall patent-system
burdens and will better direct investment, effort, invention, and disclosure towards
more creative, patentable applications.
These categorical eligibility exclusions were justified historically on both deontological
and utilitarian moral grounds. Prudence counsels retaining them, given the high social
stakes involved, the lack of theoretical or empirical demonstration that competing
innovation approaches are better, and the moral concerns that would be raised by their
elimination. The Article thus concludes with an exhortation to celebrate rather than to
reluctantly embrace categorical exclusions of patentable subject matter, their prior-art
status, and the line drawing that eligibility determinations require, to better protect the
public domain of science, nature, and ideas while simultaneously improving the patent
system.

* Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law, Chicago, Illinois. The Author was
counsel of record for law professors in the Prometheus Laboratories case and for law professors and
AARP in the Bilski case in the Supreme Court and in the Federal Circuit, and co-counsel for the
American Medical Association and other medical organizations in the Myriad Genetics case in the
Federal Circuit and in the district court. The Author thanks the many people who have contributed to
this Article at different stages of the process. The Article originated as a draft presented at the Oracle
Corporation-George Washington University Law School Symposium What’s Ahead on Highway 101
(Nov. 3, 2006). A more extensive historical treatment is the subject of a forthcoming book, Joshua D.
Sarnoff, Patents and Morality: Religion, Science, Nature, and the Law (forthcoming). Finally,
this Article is dedicated to the memory and legacy of Edward C. Walterscheid.

[53]

Sarnoff_24 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

54

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

12/5/2011 11:32 PM

[Vol. 63:53

Table of Contents
Introduction.................................................................................................. 55
I. A Very Brief History of Subject-Matter Exclusions and the
Requirement for “Invention” ............................................................... 63
A. Early Approaches ..................................................................... 63
B. Developing the Requirement for Invention in the
Application for New Things and New Uses ........................ 69
1. Requirements for Invention, Dissimilarity, and
Additional Creativity in the Means of Application............. 69
2. Expanding Eligibility to Pure Methods, Application to
Machines or Transformations, and Preemption by the
Principle of the Invention ..................................................... 71
3. Developing the Non-Analogous Uses and Markedly
Different Characteristics Tests .............................................. 77
C. The Religious Origins of the Prohibition on
Patenting Discoveries and the Moral Obligation to
Treat New Discoveries as Prior Art ..................................... 84
II. Explaining the Relationship of the Exclusions for Science,
Nature, and Ideas to Patent Eligibility and Patentable
Invention ................................................................................................. 90
A. Mistaken Modern Approaches to Eligibility ...................... 91
B. Protecting the Public Domain of Science, Nature, and
Ideas from Encroachment ....................................................... 94
C. The Actual Relationship Between Patent Eligibility
and Obviousness (and Other Patentability
Doctrines) ................................................................................. 101
III. The (Mostly) Utilitarian Benefits of Threshold Eligibility
Exclusions and Clearer Criteria .................................................. 106
A. Reduced Costs of Search and Better Evaluations
and Disclosures....................................................................... 111
B. Reduced Administrative Burdens from Fewer
(Inevitably Unpatentable) Applications............................ 114
C. Direction of Investment, Effort, Invention, and
Disclosure Towards More Creative Applications ........... 117
D. Utilitarian and Deontological Risks of Changing
the Current Approach............................................................ 121
Conclusion .................................................................................................. 124

Sarnoff_24 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

December 2011]

12/5/2011 11:32 PM

PATENT-ELIGIBLE INVENTIONS AFTER BILSKI

55

Introduction
Legal line drawing is difficult. But it is even more difficult without a
theory of why the lines are being drawn, what they are supposed to fence
in and out, and whether categorical exclusions are preferable to case-bycase rejections. This is the current state of uncertainty in the United
States in regard to eligible subject matter under section 101 of the Patent
1
Act and its relationship to various patentability doctrines following
2
Bilski v. Kappos. In Bilski, the Supreme Court by the narrowest of
majorities approved of treating business methods as patent-eligible
inventions, while noting that such claims “raise special problems in terms
of vagueness and suspect validity” and that without a “high enough
bar . . . patent examiners and courts could be flooded with claims that
3
would put a chill on creative endeavor and dynamic change.” The Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is now issuing a burgeoning set of
eligibility decisions regarding a wide range of practical and useful
4
applications including software, in Research Corporation Technologies;
medical treatment, in Prometheus Laboratories, which is currently under
5
review by the Supreme Court; and isolated genetic sequences, in the
6
Myriad Genetics case. In Myriad Genetics, the federal government
admitted that it has routinely issued patents for isolated and purified
genetic sequences even though it lacks the legislative authority to treat
7
them as patent-eligible inventions; this was not the first time the
8
government may have made such errors regarding purified materials.
The Supreme Court in Bilski reiterated, as a matter of long-standing
precedent and stare decisis, that the patent system categorically excludes
9
“laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” (referred to as
1. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
2. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
3. Id. at 3228–29.
4. Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
5. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 3027 (2011).
6. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) [hereinafter “Myriad Genetics”].
7. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 18, Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406); see also id. at 17–36.
8. See generally P.J. Federico, Louis Pasteur’s Patents, 86 Science 327 (1937) (citing Am. Fruit
Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912)) (discussing the Pasteur yeast
patent as a purified biological material, Judge Learned Hand’s famous decision justifying patents for
purified chemical materials as new and different things, and an intervening Supreme Court decision
that clarified eligibility limits, which he recognized made it doubtful that such subject matter could be
patented); Jon M. Harkness, Dicta on Adrenalin(e): Myriad Problems with Learned Hand’s Productof-Nature Pronouncements in Parke-Davis v. Mulford, J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y (forthcoming
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1881193 (examining the context
in which the patent dispute between Parke-Davis and Mulford arose).
9. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010); see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309
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“science, nature, and ideas”), despite the broad categorical language of
10
eligible subject matter recited in section 101. Various thoughtful scholars
have recently argued that we should view these exclusions from eligibility
restrictively to avoid excluding from the patent system “whole fields of
11
12
endeavor,” that we should focus principally on claim scope and should
rely principally on other patentability doctrine policy levers to constrain
13
improper access to the patent system, or that we should avoid eligibility
14
decisions entirely. The Federal Circuit under Chief Judge Rader has
signaled its desire to avoid both the “abstract idea” category and reliance
on eligibility doctrine, requiring that “this disqualifying characteristic
should exhibit itself so manifestly as to override the broad statutory
categories of eligible subject matter and the statutory context that directs
primary attention on the patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent
15
Act.”
Avoiding categorical eligibility decisions would preserve patent
claims for case-by-case validity evaluations under patentability standards
16
such as novelty, non-obviousness, and adequacy of the disclosure, which
these judges and scholars presumably believe impose better line-drawing
criteria. Implicit in this approach is the view that section 101 largely
duplicates patentability criteria that avoid “the issuance of bad patents”—
17
bad in the sense of not being “really innovative” —and that there is no
field of scientific, technological, or other functional endeavor for which
the patent system would categorically impede rather than promote

(1980) (citing, inter alia, O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–21 (1853); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55
U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853)).
10. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
11. John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
609, 613 (2009).
12. See Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1315, 1317 (2011).
13. See id. at 1326–27; cf. Duffy, supra note 11, at 623 (arguing that if a class of patents complies
with the non-obviousness requirement but nevertheless “discourages or impedes the development and
spread of useful knowledge,” patentability doctrines rather than exclusions can be changed; in
contrast, patent law has no remedy for the loss of patents and inventions that are excluded but would
meet non-obviousness and other requirements). See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy
Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575 (2003).
14. See, e.g., Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 591, 591–93 (2008)
[hereinafter Risch, Everything Is Patentable]; cf. Duffy, supra note 11, at 615 (arguing that unless
courts can create eligibility rules that are both durable and sustainable they should abandon attempts
to adopt crisp rules).
15. Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
16. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103(a), 112 (2006).
17. Stefania Fusco, In re Bilski: A Conversation with Judge Randall Rader and a First Look at the
BPAI’s Cases, 20 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 123, 145 (2010). See Michael Risch, Forward to the Past, 2009–
2010 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 333, 348 [hereinafter Risch, Forward to the Past] (noting that, during the
Bilski oral arguments, some Supreme Court Justices were concerned with eliminating “‘bad’ patents
but keep[ing] ‘good’ patents”).
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18

innovation. Because section 101 supposedly performs no unique or
useful role in placing fences at the borders of the patent system, there is
arguably no good reason to exclude from the patent system any field of
endeavor dealing with practical and useful knowledge. Rather, the only
productive role for eligibility is supposedly to exclude from the patent
system claims that are clearly overly broad compared to the inventive
contributions made by the claimants, that is, fundamental knowledge
that has not yet been developed into any practical and useful
19
application. Such claims, of course, are likely to fail under patentability
20
criteria as well.
Significantly, these critics overstate the risk of exclusion errors and
inadequately appreciate a fundamental aspect of current eligibility
doctrine, as well as the historic justifications for it and the current
benefits it supplies. This aspect renders reliance solely on patentability
standards to constrain the patent system both inefficient and morally
suspect. Thus, the Supreme Court in Bilski not only reaffirmed the
existence of the categorical exclusions from eligibility, but also reiterated
the long-standing requirement to treat such ineligible science, nature,
21
and ideas as if they were already “a familiar part of the prior art,” even
when they are newly discovered by the patent claimant. This legal fiction
exists because such discoveries must remain free for all to use as “the
22
‘basic tools of scientific and technological work.’” Without prior-art
treatment, the public domain of science, nature, and ideas could be
consumed piecemeal, even if the new discoveries could not be swallowed
whole. The patent system is not supposed to reward discoveries of basic
23
science and at least some other kinds of human discoveries, no matter

18. For example, Chief Judge Rader “strongly opposed the possibility” that the “patent system is
not optimal to foster innovation in the newest technologies and that incentives for inventions in these
fields should be found elsewhere.” Fusco, supra note 17, at 144; see, e.g., Duffy, supra note 11, at 618
(noting the lack of empirical data and knowledge sufficient to create patentable subject-matter rules to
exclude patents that “would too often severely interfere with, or discourage, development and the
further spread of useful knowledge itself” (quoting Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs.,
Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127–28 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
19. See, e.g., Lemley et al., supra note 12, at 1328–29 (discussing “fundamental” ideas “reserved to
society” that are the “building blocks of human thought” and noting that a “patent claim is ‘too broad’
in the sense that it encroaches upon society’s right to unfettered access” to such fundamental ideas);
id. at 1329 (“The worry is not that an inventor controls the application of an abstract idea, but only
that an inventor obtains rights over the idea itself.”).
20. See, e.g., Risch, Everything Is Patentable, supra, note 14, at 595 (“[A]bandoning subject matter
restrictions in favor of rigorous application of patentability requirements will not necessarily lead to
more patents in controversial areas.”).
21. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978); see Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010);
Parker, 437 U.S. at 591 (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948);
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939)).
22. Flook, 437 U.S. at 591–92 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
23. See, e.g., Hector M. Holmes, Book Review, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1431, 1432 (1932) (reviewing
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how much money, effort, creativity, and disclosure went into developing
and disseminating that highly useful knowledge. Subject-matter eligibility
doctrine polices precisely these distinctions regarding the kinds of
activities that the intellectual property law system should and should not
24
reward. We should accept no substitutes.
Doctrinally, both eligibility and patentability continue to require an
25
“invention,” even when the claims might otherwise meet the language
26
of the statutory categories or other requirements. As a result of the
prior-art status of categorically excluded science, nature, and ideas, the
human creativity involved in discovering them does not contribute to
assessing the nature, eligibility, or patentability of any claimed invention
27
in an application. Rather, patent claimants must invent, disclose, and
claim some “other inventive concept” than a merely novel, physically
28
limited application of a new discovery. Stated differently, for an eligible
and patentable invention to exist, there must be creativity in the
application of excluded discoveries. Mere novelty of the application is
not enough. For this reason, the Court in Bilski repeated language from

C.J. Hamson, Patent Rights for Scientific Discoveries (1930)); see also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526,
1553–54 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Archer, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that
embodying creative new music in a piano roll will not make the machine-readable music a patenteligible invention). But cf. Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical
Science, 114 Yale L.J. 659, 661–63 (2004) (arguing that strong patent rights induce hypothesis
generation to develop new scientific paradigms and that research tools raise the costs of exploring
existing paradigms). See generally C.J. Hamson, Patent Rights for Scientific Discoveries 20–29
(1930).
24. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35 Conn. L.
Rev. 439, 440–41 (2003) (discussing omissions from copyright and patentable subject matter, sui
generis protections, and dual coverage regarding things “thought to be worthy of protection”); cf. 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (requiring “original works of authorship” and providing an illustrative list);
Malla Pollack, Towards a Feminist Theory of the Public Domain, or Rejecting the Gendered Scope of
United States Copyrightable and Patentable Subject Matter, 12 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 603, 604–05
(2006) (discussing historically gendered exclusions from patentable subject-matter protection).
25. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (2006). See generally Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the
“Invention” Requirement, 1 APLA Q.J. 26 (1972–1973) (discussing efforts to adopt new terminology in
the 1952 Act). Congress could easily have amended section 101 to refer to whoever applies for a
patent (meeting other requirements), rather than to whoever invents. Email from Richard Stern to the
IPProfs listserv (Aug. 3, 2011) (on file with the Author).
26. Cf. Emir Aly Crowne Mohammed, What Is an Invention? A Review of the Literature on
Patentable Subject Matter, 15 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 1, 2 (2008) (“[Commentators have] questioned
whether there still needs to be an invention in the first place, before one even considers its
patentability.”); David Vaver, Invention in Patent Law: A Review and a Modest Proposal, 11 Int’l J.L.
& Info. Tech. 286, 289–90 (2003) (evaluating the meaning of invention by reference to international
treaty norms).
27. See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 115–16 (1853); Morton v. N.Y. Eye
Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 881–82 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9865).
28. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978); see Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010)
(“[O]nce that algorithm [wa]s assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered as a
whole, contain[ed] no patentable invention.” (emphasis added) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 594)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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its most recent (and most claimant-friendly) eligibility case, Diamond v.
Diehr, stating that “the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas
‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use . . . to a particular
technological environment’ or [by] adding ‘insignificant postsolution
29
activity.’”
Given the private benefits to be obtained from acquiring patents on
novel applications of categorically excluded discoveries of science,
nature, and ideas, we will increasingly confront claims that stretch the
30
boundaries of our patent system. Given this expansion and the Supreme
Court’s continued reliance on patent eligibility doctrine, the lower
courts, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and the public will
inevitably focus on this area of the law. So long as new discoveries of
science, nature, and ideas are treated as if they were prior art, however,
concerns over “preempting” all uses of these discoveries will remain
31
incoherent. Similarly, without excluding any of the creativity involved in
making the ineligible discovery, concerns regarding the overbreadth of
32
claims relative to their “practical, real-world contribution” will continue
33
to fail to supply an adequate theory of line drawing.
In contrast, recognizing the prior-art status of discoveries and the
need for invention in the application explains the origins of the Court’s
current doctrinal formulations for determining the eligibility of
particular, physical, and scope-limited claims incorporating or applying
34
ineligible discoveries. These tests are whether claimed products have
35
“markedly different characteristics” and whether claimed processes
36
reflect non-analogous uses. Further, embracing prior-art status and line
drawing will permit better tailoring of patent eligibility doctrine, as
judges will be forced to clarify the kinds and degrees of creativity that

29. 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981)).
30. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 577, 591 (1999)
(noting that due to expansion of patentable subject matter, “concerns about quality, especially in light
of the data on overall volume, point to one conclusion: the patent system is in crisis”).
31. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (noting earlier concerns that a patent “would wholly pre-empt
the [discovery] and in practical effect would be a patent on the [discovery] itself”) (quoting Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972)); id. at 3231 (allowing the claimed patent for “risk hedging would
pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract
idea”).
32. Lemley et al., supra note 12, at 1317; see, e.g., Michael Risch, New Uses for Patent Utility 13–
18 (July 27, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Risch, New Uses for Patent Utility], available
at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclt_IPSC2010_Risch.pdf.
33. Cf. Elizabeth I. Winston, The Technological Edge, Akron J. Intell. Prop. L. (forthcoming
2011) (manuscript at 8), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1692836 (“[T]o draw a line between
products of nature and man-made manipulations . . . requires analysis of the degree of sophistication
required to produce the end product.”).
34. See infra Part I.B.
35. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
36. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Elec. Supply Co., 144 U.S. 11, 18 (1892).
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37

should be required. As recognized by the four concurring Justices in
Bilski, the majority wholly failed to explain why the relatively specific
claims at issue, which applied the basic concept of hedging in a putatively
38
novel and restrictive context, were abstract ideas. The majority also
failed to explain why the even more specific dependent claims, which
limited the applications to commodities and energy markets and required
the use of well-known data-gathering and calculation techniques as
inputs to the method, added only “field of use” limits or “token
39
postsolution components” that “did not make the concept patentable.”
The Federal Circuit’s en banc approach fared no better. It improperly
adopted the Supreme Court’s “machine-or-transformation test as the
sole test for what constitutes [an eligible] ‘process’ (as opposed to just an
40
important and useful clue),” and failed to explain the kind and degree
41
of transformation that was necessary and sufficient for eligibility.
Line drawing in the medical and biotechnological fields also will
remain unclear and will appear unprincipled without recognition of the
42
prior-art status of new scientific discoveries. For example, on remand
from the Supreme Court following Bilski, the Federal Circuit in
Prometheus Laboratories distinguished the “essence” of the human
medical treatment claims at issue as physically “transformative” from the
“mere[] data-gathering steps” or “insignificant extra-solution activity” of
a clinical diagnostic claim that the Federal Circuit had earlier found to be
43
ineligible. But the decision failed to explain why the “‘gist’ or ‘heart’” or
44
“point of novelty” of the claimed invention lay in the physically
37. Cf. John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 1139, 1142
(1999) (“[O]ur long-held sense of the reach of the patent system . . . .”).
38. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231, 3236 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 3231.
40. Id. at 3226; see also id. at 3227 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)); In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954–55 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
41. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963–64.
42. See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Current State of Patent Eligibility of Medical and
Biotechnology Inventions in the United States, in Intellectual Property and Emerging
Biotechnologies (Matthew Rimmer & Alison McLennan eds., forthcoming 2011); Joshua D. Sarnoff,
Patent Eligible Medical and Biotechnology Inventions After Bilski, Prometheus, and Myriad, 19 Tex.
Intell. Prop. L.J. 393, 395 (2011) [hereinafter Sarnoff, Medical and Biotechnology Inventions].
43. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (distinguishing In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989)), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 3027 (2011); see also Christopher M. Holman, On Remand, Federal Circuit (Once
Again) Decides Prometheus v. Mayo in Favor of Patent Eligibility for Methods of Treatment and
Diagnostic Tests, Holman’s Biotech IP Blog (Dec. 17, 2010), http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/
2010/12/on-remand-federal-circuit-once-again.html (arguing that the panel decision’s attempt to
distinguish Grams was “less than entirely convincing”).
44. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty 2 (Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper No.
1735045) (quoting Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (citing Oskar
Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim 1 (Feb. 24, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1769270), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735045; see also
Kevin E. Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 Ind. L.J. 1379, 1381
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transformative application and not in the discovered correlation employed
by it. The decision also held that the treatment claims at issue did “not
preempt all uses of the natural correlations; they utilize[d] them in a
series of specific steps,” because other drugs might be found that
45
purportedly employed the same correlations. The decision thus failed to
explain why these steps were not merely insignificant extra-solution
activity that similarly prevents specific uses of natural correlations from
46
preempting other uses. It remains to be seen whether the Supreme
Court will provide any more convincing explanations for its pending
decision in Prometheus Laboratories or will find any constitutional
restrictions on creating property from the public domain, particularly in
47
light of the pending challenge in Golan v. Holder.
Part I of this Article briefly describes the two-hundred-year history
of patentable subject-matter eligibility doctrine in the United States,
48
arising from the English experience; discusses the development of the
current doctrinal standards for eligibility; and explains the origins of the
categorical exclusions and their prior-art treatment in religious and
49
deontological moral commitments. Part II discusses why alternative
approaches to eligibility focusing on claim scope or physicality will
remain misguided, derivative, and inadequate to assess inventive
50
creativity; describes how prior-art treatment of excluded discoveries
(2010) (noting that the printed matter doctrine applies a point-of-novelty approach).
45. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 628 F.3d at 1355. The court, however, failed to recognize that the
correlations applied to the observed and claimed thiopurine drugs; other drugs generating the same
metabolites would be the subject of different, unclaimed natural correlations. See Sarnoff, Medical and
Biotechnology Inventions, supra note 42, at 404.
46. Cf. Holman, supra note 43 (suggesting that claim scope was a plausible distinction of Grams,
but “would be better addressed using the enablement requirement rather than patent eligibility”).
47. 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011). Various constitutional
innovation policies and utilitarian and deontological moral concerns may justify different kinds of line
drawing for subject-matter eligibility. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Ten Law Professors in Support
of Appellee Director of the United States Patent & Trademark Office at 6–12, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (No. 2007-1130). See generally Edward C. Walterscheid, The Nature
of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective (2002). Further, the case
law history reveals that ideas should be considered abstract when they constitute “functional
properties on which claimed inventions operate or results to be achieved by employing those
properties.” Brief of Eleven Law Professors and AARP as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at
23–24, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964) (citing Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874)). See generally Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, “Clues” for
Determining Whether Business and Service Innovations Are Unpatentable Abstract Ideas, 15 Lewis &
Clark L. Rev. 109 (2011).
48. A more detailed history is provided in Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patents and Morality: Religion,
Science, Nature, and the Law (forthcoming).
49. See infra Part I; see also 1 William C. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful
Inventions § 25 (1890).
50. Cf. Risch, New Uses for Patent Utility, supra note 32, at 13–18 (discussing practical utility as a
substitute for eligibility criteria—specifically for distinguishing abstract from nonabstract ideas, laws of
nature from patentable applications, and natural products and their relationship to inherency and
public benefit) (citing, inter alia, Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 1195
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compares to other jurisdictions’ approaches and better protects against
claims that would effectively block or dominate subsequent applications
of excluded subject matter; and explains the proper relationship between
51
eligibility and various patentability doctrines. Part III discusses many
efficiency and some moral benefits of relying on categorical, threshold
eligibility determinations so long as science, nature, and ideas are treated
as prior art. Part III also explains why we should not abandon this longstanding and highly successful approach to protecting the public
52
domain, sacrifice these utilitarian benefits, or reject the deontological
moral norms that support keeping the public domain free from private
53
patent property rights. These moral norms include valuing our common
54
55
heritage, protecting freedom of thought and expressive communication,
56
preserving bodily integrity and personality, and maintaining certain
activities or things free from the patent system or subject to certain kinds

[hereinafter Risch, Reinventing Usefulness]).
51. See infra Part II; cf. Donald S. Chisum, Weeds and Seeds in the Supreme Court’s Business
Method Patents Decision: New Directions for Regulating Patent Scope, 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 11,
13 (2011) (discussing Bilski and the Court’s distinction of what Chisum calls the “Invention
Achievement Inquiry” and distinguishing it from the “Protection Scope Inquiry”).
52. But cf. Lemley, supra note 44, at 33–34 (suggesting that the Flook approach of dissecting
novelty and of excluding discoveries from inventive contributions was a new and short-lived
development, and arguing that it was properly rejected in Diehr for excluding too many useful
applications from the patent system).
53. See infra Part III; see also, e.g., Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting
DNA 21–23 (2002) (discussing moral concerns with owning genetic materials, including views that they
are the common heritage of humanity; inalienable, public property; and discoveries rather than
inventions); cf. Thomas, supra note 37, at 1141 (“[T]he patent eligibility inquiry has been reduced to
one of mere utility. This trend is a disturbing one. . . .”). But cf. Duffy, supra note 11, at 618 (“[T]he
patentable subject matter doctrines are based not on a moral or ethical decision about the desirability
of patents as an end in themselves but on empirical estimation[s] of [utilitarian innovation policy].”).
See generally The Future of the Public Domain: Identifying the Commons in Information Law
(Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness
Versus Welfare (2002); Conference: The Public Domain, 66 L. & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring
2003.
54. See, e.g., Jasper A. Bovenberg, Property Rights in Blood, Genes, and Data: Naturally
Yours? 39–49 (2006); Keith Aoki & Kennedy Luvai, Reclaiming “Common Heritage” Treatment in the
International Plant Genetic Resources Regime Complex, 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 35, 36–41.
55. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 237–38 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims);
Brief of the Software Freedom Law Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 11–14,
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964); Michael Crichton, This Essay Breaks the Law,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2006, at WK13 (discussing Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc.,
548 U.S. 124 (2006) (per curiam)).
56. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 206–11; 148 Cong. Rec. S5579
(daily ed. June 14, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy); Brief for the American Medical
Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 13, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (No. 04-607); Legislative Updates, Nat’l Inst. Health,
Off. Legis. & Pol’y Analysis (Feb. 3, 2011), http://olpa.od.nih.gov/legislation/107/pendinglegislation/
7cloning.asp.
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of equal treatment, as for tax planning methods and human organisms
58
or sporting activities.
The need to preserve a robust public domain of science, nature, and
59
ideas from encroachment by the patent system thus explains both the
need for continuing their prior-art treatment and why we cannot and
60
should not “see the wisdom of abandoning line drawing.” To extend
Fritz Machlup’s famous statement regarding arguments to abandon the
patent system, it would be “irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge, to recommend abolishing” the historic protection for science,
nature, and ideas, provided by prior-art treatment in eligibility doctrine
61
and by the requirement for invention in the application. The Article
concludes with a brief exhortation to celebrate rather than to reluctantly
embrace categorical exclusions of patentable subject-matter, their priorart status, and the line drawing that eligibility determinations require, to
better protect the public domain of science, nature, and ideas while
simultaneously improving the patent system.

I. A Very Brief History of Subject-Matter Exclusions
and the Requirement for “Invention”
A. Early Approaches
In England in 1795, in the famous James Watt steam engine case,
Boulton v. Bull, Chief Judge Eyre expressed the unanimous view that
62
“[u]ndoubtedly there can be no patent for a mere principle.” In contrast,
it was acknowledged that patents could issue for the invention of
63
“manufactures” under the 1623 English Statute of Monopolies, which
“applied not only to things made, but to the practice of making, to
principles carried into practice in a new manner, to new results of
64
principles carried into practice.” The critical issue for the case, on which
the judges split, was whether patents could issue for practical methods

57. See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 14(a), 33(a), 125 Stat. 284,
327, 340 (2011).
58. See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and Industry
Norms, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 875, 876–77; Jeffrey A. Smith, It’s Your Move—No It’s Not! The
Application of Patent Law to Sports Moves, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1051, 1082–83 (1999).
59. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (“[Prior eligibility frameworks] risk obscuring
the larger object of securing patents for valuable inventions without transgressing the public domain.”
(emphasis added)).
60. Risch, Forward to the Past, supra note 17, at 365.
61. Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, 85th Cong., Study of the
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary 80
(1958).
62. (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651, 667 (opinion of Lord Eyre, C.J.) (emphasis added); see id. at 662
(opinion of Buller, J.) (“[A]n idea or a principle alone would not support the patent.”).
63. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6.
64. Boulton, 126 Eng. Rep. at 665.
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(processes) of applying scientific principles that were disembodied from
any particular arrangement of machinery through which those principles
operated, and for which arrangements it was acknowledged that a patent
could issue; that is, whether patents could issue for pure method claims
divorced from particular structural combinations or even from specific
65
contexts. Stated differently, ineligible mere principles—which constituted
either scientific discoveries or abstract ideas—were distinguished from
principles of invention, and it was unclear at the time whether such
inventive principles could include pure methods.
At the end of the eighteenth century, the United States Constitution
vested in Congress the power to grant exclusive rights to “Inventors” for
66
their “Discoveries.” As discussed in more detail below, discoveries of
inventors had a particular meaning, distinct from discoveries of science
67
and nature and thus from the mere principles discussed in Boulton. In
the terminology of the time, scientific and natural discoveries were the
68
province of “natural philosophy.” The exclusion from patent eligibility
for mere principles was also well recognized in the United States: “[A]
patent may be for a new and useful art; but it must be practical, it must
be applicable and refer[a]ble to something which may prove it to be
useful. A mere abstract principle is unsusceptible of appropriation by a
69
patent.”
As Thomas Jefferson famously explained in 1813, ideas are
nonrivalrous and thus are not proper subjects of exclusive rights at
natural law:

65. Compare Boulton, 126 Eng. Rep. at 667 (Lord Eyre, C.J.) and id. at 659 (Rooke, J.), with id.
at 482 (Heath, J.) and id. at 662, 664–65 (Buller, J.).
66. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
67. See Walterscheid, supra note 47, at 125–33 (citing sources and discussing historic difference
in meaning between “Science” and “Useful Arts”); cf. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (“The
rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot be patented rests . . . on the more fundamental
understanding that they are not the kind of ‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to protect.”);
Amicus Curiae Brief of Center for Advanced Study and Research in Intellectual Property
(“CASRIP”) of the University of Washington School of Law, and of CASRIP Research Affiliate
Scholars, In Support of Affirmance of the Judgment in Favor of Respondent at 11 n.9, 25 n.44, Bilski
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964) [hereinafter CASRIP Bilski Brief] (arguing that these
terms express “essentially the same limitation,” discussing limits on the meaning of “useful arts,” and
noting that “basic principles are neither Arts nor Discoveries of Inventors”); Walterscheid, supra
note 47, at 348–57 (arguing that “Discoveries [of] Inventors” must be read in conjunction with the
object of “promotion . . . of useful arts’” and interpreting such terms by reference to developing
English practice in Boulton and its limits on patents for principles of nature).
68. See, e.g., Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language, in Miniature 169 (W.P. & L.
Blake Pubs., 1st Am. ed. 1804) (“[‘Philosophy’ is] knowledge natural or moral, the hypothesis upon
which natural effects are explained”); William Shakespeare, Hamlet act 1, v. 166–67, n.167
(Houghton Mifflin 1974) (defining “philosophy” as “natural philosophy, science” in regard to
Hamlet’s famous line to Horatio).
69. Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 846, 852 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 4559) (emphasis added).
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[Ideas are] incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation.
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society may
give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an
encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but
this may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of
70
the society, without claim or complaint from anybody.

Further, only some kinds of ideas could be made, by law, the proper
subject of exclusive private property: discoveries of inventors that were
not merely abstract principles, scientific principles, or naturally occurring
materials, which subsequent cases described as “laws of nature, physical
71
phenomena, and abstract ideas.”
In 1790, pursuant to the patent power vested by the Constitution,
Congress created a Patent Board and authorized it to grant patents to
inventors who had “invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture,
72
engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein.” The
contemporaneous meaning of the term “useful art,” in both the
73
Constitution and the statute, is subject to significant dispute, but to
some extent the statute must have reflected that the exclusive rights
contemplated by the Constitution (including copyrights) were intended
74
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Significantly, the
Patent Board adopted various restrictions on what qualified as a
statutory “invention” or “discovery,” in particular that the application of
a machine to a new use, changes in materials of construction, changes of
form, and the use of previously known implements in combination (such
75
as using a saw and axe together) were not patentable. Implicit in this
approach was the belief that the public’s knowledge of a machine
76
entitled it to “any use of which it is susceptible.” Providing exclusive
rights for applying existing machines to new uses or to new materials, a

70. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in Thomas Jefferson,
The Portable Thomas Jefferson 525, 530 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Penguin Books 1977) (1975)
[hereinafter Jefferson Letter] (emphasis added); cf. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,
250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[T]he noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths
ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication . . . free as the air to
common use.”).
71. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
309 (1980)).
72. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110.
73. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. Compare, e.g., Noah Webster, American
Dictionary of the English Language (1st ed. 1828) (distinguishing useful arts from other arts), with
Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 533 (1888) (“[U]seful arts [are] arts which may be used to
advantage.”).
74. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Walterscheid, supra note 47, at 116–17 (arguing that the
usual interpretation is that the patent power was restricted to promoting the useful arts, and the
copyright power to promoting science, given the balanced composition style adopted by the Framers).
75. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9, 10 n.3 (1966); Jefferson Letter, supra note 70, at
531–32.
76. Jefferson Letter, supra note 70, at 531.
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patent would take this right from the public and give it to a monopolist.
Similarly, mere changes of form or of materials for constructing machines
would simply apply the same inventive principle already known by the
public, and thus would deprive the public of opportunities to make and
use machines already within its grasp, even if they had not yet been
78
constructed. As Thomas Jefferson colorfully explained, “But for this
rule, all the changes of fashion in dress would have been under the tax of
79
patentees.”
In 1793, Congress codified at least one of the Board’s negative rules
80
of patentability, specifying that “simply changing the form or the
proportions of any machine, or composition of matter, in any degree,
81
shall not be deemed a discovery.” Congress thus excluded from patent
eligibility as not “inventions” or “discoveries” things that, although
novel, the Board had treated as not patentable because they were obvious
82
due to constructive public possession. Further, by excluding changes of
form, proportions, or composition, Congress effectively prompted courts
to restrict patents to new principles of invention employed by particular
83
machines. For similar machines to be patentable, they would have to
84
operate according to different principles.
Nevertheless, Congress in 1793 also expanded patent-eligible
subject matter to compositions of matter, adopting what is essentially the
same terminology as in the modern statute, though the term “art” was
85
replaced in 1952 by the term “process”: “any new and useful art,
86
machine, manufacture or composition of matter.” Although the
87
contemporaneous meaning of “art” and “useful art” is not entirely clear,
77. Id.
78. See id.; see also Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 41 (1875).
79. Jefferson Letter, supra note 70, at 531.
80. The precise origins of the relevant provision are in doubt. Joseph Barnes proposed the
language to Congress, see Edward C. Walterscheid, The Hotchkiss Unobviousness Standard: Early
Judicial Activism in the Patent Law, 13 J. Intell. Prop. L. 103, 109 (2005), but the same language had
previously been enacted in the French Patent Act of 1791, see John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A
Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 36 (2007).
81. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (emphasis added).
82. See Duffy, supra note 11, at 624–25 (noting appropriate treatment at the time as an eligibility
issue).
83. See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 431 (1822); Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 846,
852 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 4559), rev’d on other grounds, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454 (1818); see also
Walterscheid, supra note 80, at 108–15 (discussing doctrinal changes resulting from the amended
statutory language).
84. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the
Future, Part I (1790–1870), 87 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 371, 386–91 (2005) (discussing
principles of invention and conceptual problems regarding their level of generality under the 1793 Act,
which required different principles for patent eligibility, and noting changes to claiming practices
resulting from Evans, prior to their codification in the 1836 Act).
85. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
86. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319.
87. See supra notes 67, 73 and accompanying text.
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at the end of the eighteenth century, pure method patents—methods
claiming all future applications and not merely those substantially similar
88
to the disclosed implementing machinery and their equivalents —were
ineligible for protection and remained so until the late nineteenth
89
century. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between pure methods not
limited to specific machines on the one hand, and the scientific principles
on which they operate on the other. This distinction is critical to
understand, as it distinguishes between the categorically ineligible
subject matter and, at least potentially, eligible applications thereof.
Under the 1836 Act, which preserved the statutory eligibility
90
categories of the 1793 Act, the Supreme Court observed in the seminal
case of O’Reilly v. Morse that newly discovered scientific principles simply
were not patent eligible; only particular configurations of machinery
91
92
applying those principles were. Discussing a then-recent English case,
the Court noted:
Neilson claimed no particular mode of constructing the receptacle, or
of heating it. . . . [T]he court at first doubted, whether it was a patent
for any thing more than the discovery that hot air would promote the
ignition of fuel better than cold. And if this had been the construction,
the court, it appears, would have held his patent to be void; because the
discovery of a principle in natural philosophy or physical science, is not
patentable.
But after much consideration, it was finally decided that this principle
must be regarded as well known, and that the plaintiff had invented a
mechanical mode of applying it to furnaces; and that his invention
consisted in interposing a heated receptacle, between the blower and
the furnace, and by this means heating the air after it left the blower,
and before it was thrown into the fire. . . .
Undoubtedly, the principle that hot air will promote the ignition of
fuel better than cold, was embodied in this machine. But the patent was
not supported because this principle was embodied in it. . . .
. . . If the Court of Exchequer had said that Neilson’s patent was for the
[scientific] discovery, that hot air would promote ignition better than
cold, and that he had an exclusive right to use it for that purpose, there
might, perhaps, have been some reason to rely upon it. But the court
93
emphatically denied this right to such a patent.

88. See Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 268–69 (1853); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15
How.) 62, 115–16 (1853); see also Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 517 (1818); Howe v. Abbott,
12 F. Cas. 656, 657–58 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No. 6766); Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 727 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107); Barrett v. Hall, 2 F. Cas. 914, 923 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 1047); Lowell v.
Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568).
89. See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876); Brief of Eleven Law Professors and AARP
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 18–19, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964).
90. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119.
91. 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 115–16.
92. Neilson v. Harford, (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266, 1267–68.
93. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 115–16 (emphasis added).
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Two aspects of this discussion from the Morse decision are critical.
First, the basis for finding patentability was not the fact that the machine
embodied (that is, applied in a novel, concrete, and particularized
manner) a newly discovered scientific principle. Rather, what grounded
patent eligibility was the inventive (in other words, creative as well as
novel) application of that principle reflected in the particular mechanical
mode invented by Neilson or Morse. Stated differently, the principle of
94
invention (the specified “means . . . to produce the result or effect” )
capable of being patented by Neilson or Morse was a principle in
addition to that of the discovery of the natural properties of combustion
or electromagnetism; it was a principle regarding the configuration of
machinery or the arranged steps of a specific process, that employed the
scientific discovery, and not merely the application of the discovery to a
new use.
As stated a year earlier in Le Roy v. Tatham,
In all such cases, the processes used to extract, modify, and
concentrate natural agencies, constitute the invention. The
elements of the power exist; the invention is not in discovering
them, but in applying them to useful objects.
....
In the case of Bean v. Smallwood . . . Mr. Justice Story said, “He
(the patentee) says that the same apparatus, stated in this last
claim, has been long in use, and applied, if not to chairs, at least in
other machines, to purposes of a similar nature. If this be so, then
the invention is not new, but at most is an old invention . . . applied
to a new purpose. . . . If it is old and well known, and applied only
95
to a new purpose, that does not make it patentable.”

Second and more importantly, merely applying the new scientific
discovery to exploit its properties in a noninventive, but novel, manner
could not have justified a patent. This is because the Court in Morse had
held that even a newly discovered scientific principle “must be regarded
96
as well known.” As Le Roy had indicated, there would be no eligible
invention in merely applying the (fictionally) well-known scientific
97
principle to a “new purpose.” Although the 1836 Act had eliminated
the 1793 Act’s language stating that changes to form or proportions were
98
not discoveries, the courts had continued to require a new “principle of
99
invention” to establish patent eligibility. Invention—both for patent

94. Id. at 119.
95. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175–77 (1852) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Bean v.
Smallwood, 2 F. Cas. 1142 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 1173)).
96. 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 116.
97. 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 177.
98. See Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119; Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat.
318, 319.
99. See Sarnoff, supra note 84, at 387–89; Edward C. Walterscheid, Novelty and the Hotchkiss
Standard, 20 Fed. Cir. B.J. 219, 255 (2010).
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eligibility and for patentability—thus required creativity in the application
of scientific discoveries; that is, more than merely applying the discoveries
to a new use, as reflected in the particular machinery or method steps
100
described and claimed in the patent.
B. Developing the Requirement for Invention in the Application
for New Things and New Uses
1. Requirements for Invention, Dissimilarity, and Additional
Creativity in the Means of Application
Three years before Morse, in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Supreme
Court introduced the requirement that the level of creativity necessary
for an eligible and patentable “invention” reflect more than the
“ingenuity or skill . . . possessed by an ordinary mechanic” to achieve a
101
new result. Invention, like the earlier statutory exclusion from eligible
discoveries, required “ingenuity . . . [beyond] judgment and skill in the
selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the
102
instrument for the purposes intended.” Hotchkiss thus stands for,
among other things, the principle that the statutory eligibility categories
(the one at issue being manufactures), did not include many novel
creations otherwise falling within the statutory categories of subject
103
matter, as they were not considered patentable inventions.
The Hotchkiss Court, however, did not make clear whether it
believed this interpreted or created limitation on eligibility was a
constitutional requirement, a statutory construction based on the
inherent meaning of the statutory term “invention,” or a judicially
104
adopted limitation. The Court also did not make clear the kind and
degree of ingenuity required for invention, other than that it was more
105
than mechanical skill. But the Court did clearly indicate that the very
concept of an eligible and potentially patentable “invention” (which is
the subject of the patent laws) requires both novelty and sufficient
creativity to generate new conceptual things; mere novel variations of
existing things or novel combinations of them that produced better

100. See, e.g., Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 47, at 119–20 (citing Giles S. Rich, Principles of
Patentability, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 393, 393–94 (1960)).
101. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 265 (1850).
102. Id. at 266.
103. Cf. Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U.S. 187, 199 (1876) (“[T]he substitution of equivalents, doing the
same thing as the original invention by substantially the same means, is not such an invention as will
sustain a patent. . . .”) (emphasis added) (citing Smith v. Nichols, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 112, 119 (1874)).
104. Cf. Walterscheid, supra note 80, 124–26 (2005) (arguing that the Court in Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), interpreted the Constitution to impose a requirement of inventive
creativity beyond novelty, but did not justify the specific requirement of obviousness on this
requirement).
105. See Walterscheid, supra note 99, at 262–63.
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106

results were not inventions. The Court thus suggested in dicta that a
substituted material that resulted in changing an old manufacture into a
different thing (“resulted in a new and useful article”) would be “the
107
proper subject of a patent.”
Difficult line-drawing decisions are required to determine when a
qualitatively or categorically new thing has been created, rather than just
a novel variation of an existing thing. Similarity and difference are
notoriously difficult to pin down theoretically, and may follow, rather
than precede, the policy judgments that specify the relevant
108
distinguishing criteria. Accordingly, theoretically undetermined choices
must be made to assess the nature and sufficiency of invention (in other
words, the kind and degree of required creativity) of claimed new things
derived from pre-existing (particularly naturally occurring) things, or of
claimed new means for applying preexisting knowledge, particularly
scientific principles or laws of nature.
In 1887 in Hartranft v. Wiegmann, the Supreme Court articulated a
standard, in the context of import duties rather than patent law, for when
109
a new “manufacture” had been created from natural materials. To
qualify as a manufacture required “a new and different article, having a
distinctive name, character, or use . . . . The application of labor to an
article, either by hand or by mechanism, does not make the article
110
necessarily a manufactured article . . . .” The Court in Hartranft thus
distinguished merely novel creations from manufactures, and thereby
imposed a requirement for line drawing notwithstanding the human or
111
machine labor applied to improve the natural thing.
But
understandably, given that it was not a patent case, the Court did not
specify how to distinguish for patent eligibility purposes the similarity or
difference of newly created things from natural things.
Since Hartranft, the Court has not been terribly clear in specifying
how, why, and on what criteria to draw the relevant lines between
patent-eligible new things or new processes on the one hand, and the
ineligible products of nature they derive from or the laws of nature or
112
abstract ideas they apply on the other. Nor is the terminology of

106. See Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 265–66.
107. See id. at 265.
108. See, e.g., Similarity, in M.I.T. Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences 757 (Robert A.
Wilson & Frank C. Keil eds., 2001) (similarity judgments are “totally unconstrained” without
reference to a property “that performs all of the explanatory work”) (citing, inter alia, Nelson
Goodman, Seven Strictures on Similarity, in Problems and Projects (1972)); cf. Ferdinand de
Saussure, Course in General Linguistics 115 (Roy Harris trans., Open Court 1986) (1913); William
James, The Principles of Psychology 459 (Dover Press 1950) (1890).
109. 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887).
110. Id.
111. Id. (discussing scouring of wool and ginning of cotton).
112. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (distinguishing Funk Bros. Seed
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“discovery” or “invention” particularly helpful, given that the Constitution
113
and statute apply conjointly or circularly to both terms. Rather, the
Court has continued to focus its distinctions on the belief that a claimed
application of a newly identified discovery is not a patent-eligible
invention simply because the discovery is applied to a particular and new
114
use. As stated by Justice Nelson in 1862, in the lower court case of
Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, a new and additional principle to
such mere application of a discovery was required for invention:
A discovery of a new principle, force, or law operating, or which can be
made to operate, on matter, will not entitle the discoverer to a patent.
It is only where the explorer has gone beyond the mere domain of
discovery, and has laid hold of the new principle, force, or law, and
connected it with some particular medium or mechanical contrivance by
which, or through which, it acts on the material world, that he can
secure the exclusive control of it under the patent laws. He then
controls his discovery through the means by which he has brought it into
practical action, or their equivalent, and only through them. It is then an
invention, although it embraces a discovery. Sever the force or principle
discovered from the means or mechanism through which he has
brought it into the domain of invention, and it immediately falls out of
that domain and eludes his grasp. It is then a naked discovery, and not
115
an invention.

2. Expanding Eligibility to Pure Methods, Application to Machines
or Transformations, and Preemption by the Principle of the
Invention
In 1877 in Cochrane v. Deener, the Court first indicated—under the
1870 Act, which did not change the patent eligibility criteria from the
116
1836 Act —that pure methods could be considered eligible inventions:
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular form of
the instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed. . . . A process is a mode
of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act,
or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed
and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as
patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law,
it is an art. . . . The process requires that certain things should be done
with certain substances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be used
117
in doing this may be of secondary consequence.

Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948)).
113. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Inventors [for their] . . . Discoveries”); 35 U.S.C. § 100(a)
(2006) (defining “invention” as “invention or discovery”).
114. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (“[T]he Pythagorean theorem would not
have been patentable, or partially patentable, because a patent application contained a final step
indicating that the formula, when solved, could be usefully applied to existing surveying techniques.”).
115. 17 F. Cas. 879, 881 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9865) (emphasis added).
116. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198, 201.
117. 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876).
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Thus, under Cochrane, inventive processes could be patent eligible by
employing new discoveries without limitation to specific machines or, in
118
the earlier terminology, to specified means.
But even under Cochrane, an eligible “invention” not employing a
particular apparatus still required a physical transformation and
119
120
reduction of matter “to a different state or thing” —in other words, a
change in the state or nature of the thing. As later argued to the Court in
121
Gottschalk v. Benson,
Though the Morse case and The Telephone Cases do not state the rule,
in so many words, that patents on processes which do not involve the
manipulation and transformation of physical materials from one
physical or chemical state into another, must contain limitations
confining the monopoly grant to the practice of the method by means
of particular types of apparatus, we submit that the cases follow such a
rule—implicitly or explicitly—and that they cannot be rationalized
122
otherwise.
123

Although the Court in Benson (and later in Parker v. Flook and Bilski
124
v. Kappos ) rejected the argument that the machine-or-transformation
precedents established a limiting rule of patent eligibility, it
acknowledged that the Court’s precedents on method patents had all
125
conformed to that test.
The “machine-or-transformation” framework therefore is not the
standard for eligibility, but merely the consequence, based on the facts of
the cases presented, of the requirement that a patent-eligible invention
must reflect invention in the application of otherwise ineligible science,
nature, or ideas. Prior to Cochrane’s expansion to pure methods of the
126
Court’s earlier limits on method claims, eligible inventions necessarily
had to be limited to specific physical embodiments that accomplished
127
specific results, and thus had to be tied to “particular” machines (or
articles of manufacture) through which the applications of science,
128
nature, or ideas were achieved. After Cochrane, patentable process
inventions could be articulated without limitation to such particular

118. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182–84 (1981).
119. Id.
120. Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 788.
121. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
122. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 9, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (No. 71-485).
123. 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978).
124. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226–27 (2010).
125. 409 U.S. at 71.
126. See Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 268 (1853) (“[A] man cannot have a patent for
the function or abstract effect of a machine, but only for the machine which produces it.”); id. at 269
(“He cannot describe a machine which will perform a certain function, and then claim the function
itself, and all other machines that may be invented to perform the same function.”).
127. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70.
128. See Sarnoff, supra note 84, at 390–91.
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physical implementing structures, but still required, for eligibility,
creativity in the application; that is, they required transformation to a
129
“different state or thing.”
Further, before the modern “information age,” inventive creativity
required physical implementations for its useful application, and thus
130
resulted in physical transformations. Cochrane therefore required
physical or chemical transformation just as Hartranft required a different
131
thing to be created. At that time, all of the eligibility precedents could
readily be fit into the machine-or-transformation framework. But mere
physical implementation or transformation was not sufficient for
eligibility, as uncreative applications of new discoveries, uncreative
applications of existing inventions to new uses, or uncreative modifications
of preexisting things also would reflect physical implementation or
transformation, but would not result in new and eligible inventions.
Thus, the Court in Benson, and again in Bilski, could treat the machineor-transformation framework as “the clue” to patent eligibility for
processes, even if it was not “intended to be an exhaustive or exclusive
132
test” thereof.
133
By authorizing pure method patents in Cochrane, moreover, the
Court also expanded the scope of patents to cover unenumerated, and
likely uncontemplated, means of accomplishing specified results. This
placed even greater emphasis on the newly strengthened requirement for
134
distinct claims and on the sufficiency of the written description of the
invention to support claims of greater breadth that would then apply to
any physical means of implementation that fell within the meaning of the
135
claim language. Following Cochrane, it became even more difficult to
distinguish, based on claim scope, between an ineligible application of a
categorically excluded, newly discovered scientific principle or
phenomenon and an eligible inventive process employing that principle
or phenomenon and not limited to particular physical means. This is both
because the scope of patent-eligible inventions expanded—so as to
potentially cover all practical applications of newly discovered
phenomena—and because the kind and degree of creativity required for
an eligible invention may have been reduced. Thus, the distinction of

129. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876).
130. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (comparing the “Information Age” to the
“Industrial Age”).
131. Compare Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 788, with Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887).
132. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226–27 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70).
133. 94 U.S. at 788.
134. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201.
135. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the
Future: Part II (1870–1952), 87 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 441, 451–54 (2005) (discussing effects
of the distinct claiming requirement and its relationship to the expanded scope of permissible claims
following Cochrane).
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creative and eligible from mere and ineligible applications may have
become somewhat more difficult to discern.
In 1888, in the famous Alexander Graham Bell telephone case
(Dolbear v. American Bell Telephone Co.), the Supreme Court upheld a
patent for a very broad process claim:
In the present case the claim is not for the use of a current of
electricity in its natural state as it comes from the battery, but for
putting a continuous current in a closed circuit into a certain specified
condition suited to the transmission of vocal and other sounds, and
using it in that condition for that purpose. . . . Bell was the first to
discover this fact, and how to put such a current in such a condition,
and what he claims is its use in that condition for that purpose, just as
Morse claimed his current in his condition for his purpose. . . . It may
be that electricity cannot be used at all for the transmission of speech
except in the way Bell has discovered, and that therefore, practically,
his patent gives him its exclusive use for that purpose, but that does not
make his claim one for the use of electricity distinct from the particular
process with which it is connected in his patent. It will, if true, show
more clearly the great importance of his discovery, but it will not
136
invalidate his patent.

As the Court later explained in Benson, Bell’s claim “was not one
137
for all telephonic use of electricity.” As the Court had suggested in
Dolbear, using Benson’s modern terminology, Bell’s claim might
permissibly “pre-empt” all uses (that is, the full scope of application) of
the invented process and—if the invented process were the only means of
accomplishing the desired result—all means of accomplishing the
138
particular end that the invented process achieves. But Bell’s claim did
not, and could not, preempt all uses of the previously known, or newly
discovered, natural phenomenon—electronic transmission of signals—
that Bell’s creative, invented process employed. It could, however,
preempt yet to be discovered means of accomplishing the creative end
result of placing circuits in the appropriate condition for signal
139
transmission. This was because invention required creativity in the
application of the natural phenomenon; Bell’s invention was not the
mere application of newly discovered but inherent properties of
140
electricity to the novel context of speech transmission.

136. 126 U.S. 1, 534–35 (1888).
137. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (citing Dolbear, 126 U.S. at 535).
138. See id. at 72.
139. See Dolbear, 126 U.S. at 538–39 (noting that Bell’s claim was for the use of electricity in a
particular condition to transmit signals, that “long before he did so it was believed by scientists that it
could be done by means of electricity” but Bell “discovered the way of doing it,” although the patent
was not confined to the “mere means he improvised to prove the reality of his conception” (emphasis
added)).
140. See id.; cf. id. at 573 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“[T]here are two modes (as yet discovered) by
which these undulations [of electric current] may be thus produced.”).

Sarnoff_24 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

December 2011]

12/5/2011 11:32 PM

PATENT-ELIGIBLE INVENTIONS AFTER BILSKI

75

In contrast, and unlike in Dolbear, the Supreme Court in Benson
failed to appreciate the requirement for additional creativity in the
application, which distinguished claims to inventions from claims to
ineligible natural phenomena. The Court thus rejected the implication in
Dolbear that a patent could issue that preempted all means of
accomplishing the inventive end to be achieved—at least when the end
was the only practical application for a new natural or abstract discovery:
The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical
application except in connection with a digital computer, which means
that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly preempt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a
141
patent on the algorithm itself.

Benson’s formulation focuses on the scope of the effects of granting
the patent rather than on the nature of the invention actually reflected by
the claim; in other words, on preemption of applications or of sequential
142
invention. But this formulation confuses the distinction between
ineligible discoveries and patentable inventions, and thus between
science, nature, and ideas on the one hand and human technology and
practical applications on the other. The closed circuits at issue in Dolbear
did not exist in nature; they were synthetic creations of humans and thus
their principles of operation and the technology they reflected were, at
least according to the Court, sufficiently creative inventions that could be
143
patented without regard to their preemptive scope.
Six years after Benson, in Parker v. Flook, the Court reiterated its
earlier understanding that a patentable invention required additional
creativity in the application of newly discovered phenomena, rather than
a merely narrow scope of exclusion, which does not chill too much
sequential innovation: “Even though a phenomenon of nature or
mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive application of
the principle may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a
phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive
144
concept in its application.”
Three years later still, in Diamond v. Diehr, the Court reiterated
145
that a mathematical formula cannot be patented and that “this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment. . . . Similarly,

141. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72.
142. See Chisum, supra note 51, at 28–30 (discussing how Benson improperly focused on the scope
of exclusion rather than on the nature of the disclosed invention).
143. See 126 U.S. at 538–39.
144. 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (emphasis added); cf. Lemley et al., supra 12, at 1330 (“Overclaiming
under § 101 . . . is primarily concerned with removing obstructions to follow-on innovation.”).
145. This implies that mathematical formulas (and similarly formulaic algorithms) are either
“abstract ideas” or “natural phenomena.” See Samuelson & Schultz, supra 47, at 112–13 (discussing
Bilski’s treatment of algorithms as abstract ideas).
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insignificant postsolution activity will not transform an unpatentable
146
principle into a patentable process.” Although the Court in Diehr did
not adequately explain why this was the case, it at least acknowledged
that the mere limitation of the formula to a specific context or the
addition of insignificant physical implementation steps would not by
itself be sufficient to constitute creative, and thus inventive, applications
147
of the formula.
Although the Court in Diehr reiterated Flook’s requirement to treat
the newly discovered formula as if it were already in the prior art, the
Court criticized the argument that the claim could not be eligible if every
element except the formula was already known in the art:
[A] new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even
though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in
common use before the combination was made. The “novelty” of any
element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no
relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls
within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter. . . .
....
. . . The fallacy in this argument is that we did not hold in Flook that
the mathematical algorithm could not be considered at all when
making the § 101 determination. To accept the analysis proffered by
the [Government] would, if carried to its extreme, make all inventions
unpatentable because all inventions can be reduced to underlying
principles of nature which, once known, make their implementation
148
obvious.

Although the Court was undoubtedly technically correct that a
combination of old elements may be patent eligible, its discussion of the
need to focus on the claim as a whole, rather than on dissecting claim
elements to determine the point of novelty, was misleading on two levels.
First, even in Flook, the Court had rejected the idea that claim dissection
was required, holding that its “approach to respondent’s application is,
however, not at all inconsistent with the view that a patent claim must be
considered as a whole” before determining whether the claim “considered
as a whole” reflected any “other inventive concept in its application” of
149
the categorically excluded algorithm. Second, precluding the novelty of a
newly discovered but ineligible algorithm from directly supplying the
eligibility of a claim containing old elements does not necessarily lead to
finding all implementations (applications) employing the algorithm
obvious, any more than a novel combination of prior-art elements is
inherently obvious without considering the creativity reflected by the

146.
147.
148.
149.

450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1980) (internal citation omitted) (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 584).
See id.
Id. at 188–89, 189 n.12.
437 U.S. at 594.
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150

combination. Rather, it is precisely those creative applications that are
not implicit in light of underlying scientific principles that constitute an
“invention” eligible for patenting.
Diehr, like Benson, thus imposed needless confusion by permitting
the creativity of the ineligible discovery to contribute directly to the
eligibility of a claimed application without considering whether there was
any additional creativity in the application itself. This confusion is
particularly evident given the Court’s simultaneous acceptance in Diehr
of the premise that the algorithm itself could not be patented when
merely limited to particular fields of application (technological contexts)
151
or when combined with insignificant (physical) activity. Such claims
152
when viewed “as a whole” constitute the same “type of subject matter,”
processes, as do creative and inventive applications of new discoveries—
they just lack invention in those applications. Similarly, the Court’s
reference to the transformation prong of the machine-or-transformation
framework to suggest when a claim “considered as a whole[] is
153
performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect”
provides no basis to distinguish when sufficient transformations have
154
been created, as is required under Cochrane. Diehr thus offered no
means to assess whether particular processes applying scientific
discoveries and abstract ideas were or were not inventions.
3.

Developing the Non-Analogous Uses and Markedly Different
Characteristics Tests

Returning to the nineteenth century, in 1892—four years after
Dolbear—the Court in Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Electric Supply
Co. noted that “nothing is better settled in this court than that the
application of an old process to a new and analogous purpose does not
involve invention, even if the new result had not before been
155
contemplated.” Clearly, the Court could not have understood Dolbear
to permit eligibility based simply on novelty or physical transformations.
In contrast, a new use of an existing thing—including a natural product—
or of an existing process could be an eligible invention if that new use
was not analogous to a known use of the thing or process and thus was a
sufficiently creative application:

150. Compare, e.g., United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 45–48, 50–51 (1966), with Anderson’sBlack Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 58–62 (1969).
151. See 450 U.S. at 191–92.
152. Id. at 188–89.
153. Id. at 192 (“[P]erforming a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g.,
transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing) . . . .”).
154. See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877).
155. 144 U.S. 11, 18 (1892) (emphasis added).
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On the other hand, if an old device or process be put to a new use
which is not analogous to the old one, and the adaptation of such
process to the new use is of such a character as to require the exercise
of inventive skill to produce it, such new use will not be denied the
156
merit of patentability.

Although Ansonia Brass did not directly address applications of
newly discovered natural things or scientific knowledge, this requirement
for creativity of claimed applications was perhaps best described in that
context by the Ninth Circuit in Wall v. Leck, decided three years later:
[E]mployment of [a scientific discovery] in the modes or through the
instrumentalities by which it is applied in nature is a mere imitation of
what every man is able to perceive and reproduce as well as [t]he
[patentee]. All endeavors to confine it to himself are at once futile and
unjust. . . . The laws . . . do not permit any man to exclusively use the
conditions which are the gifts of nature, simply because he was the first
one to discover its value. Not until some new instrument or method is
contrived for its direction towards ends which it cannot naturally
157
accomplish does his creative genius manifest itself.

The implication of Wall is crystal clear. To be an eligible invention, the
claimed, novel application of a natural phenomenon or scientific
principle must exhibit some function different than that which exists in
nature. It is that different function which supplies the requisite creativity
for the claimed, novel application of a thing or a process to be considered
158
an eligible invention.
In the first half of the twentieth century, in American Fruit Growers,
Inc. v. Brogdex Co., the Court held—based on Hartranft—that to be
patent eligible as a “manufacture,” a new and different article created
from pre-existing nature (or other human-created inventions) had to
“possess[] a new or distinctive form, quality, or property. . . . There [must
be a] change in the name, appearance, or general character of the [thing
159
from which it was created].” Echoing Cochrane, the Court also noted
that there must be a physical “transformation” involved in making “a
160
new and different article . . . emerge.” But as it was already known in
the art that boracic acid prevented mold (on fruit), the “mere
substitution of [alkaline borax for boracic acid, even if novel] would not
161
involve invention.” Such a substitution would generate a novel but
necessarily analogous, and thus ineligible, product, just as the novel but
162
analogous use was ineligible in Ansonia Brass. This was true even

156. Id.
157. 66 F. 552, 558 (9th Cir. 1895) (emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, Robinson, supra 49, § 186).
158. Cf. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
159. 283 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1931); see also id. at 12–13 (citing Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615
(1887)).
160. Id. at 13.
161. Id. at 14 (citing 1 Albert H. Walker, Walker on Patents § 426 (6th ed. 1929)).
162. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Elec. Supply Co., 144 U.S. 11, 18 (1892).
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though the novel combination had properties (mold resistance) that were
not possessed by the natural article (fresh fruit) alone, and even though
the claimant had discovered a natural property regarding inhibition of
blue mold spore growth, that is, that borax was “especially potent in its
163
retarding and inhibiting action.” The product remained analogous to
natural fruit, with the new property merely “protect[ing] . . . against
deterioration” without any “change in the name, appearance, or general
164
character of the fruit.” The product claim thus was ineligible because
the natural thing (fruit) was not transformed into an invention; the
process claims were invalid as not new in light of analogous prior-art
165
treatment of fruit with boracic acid.
In the most recent Supreme Court case on patent-eligible things
created from products of nature, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Court
reiterated Hartranft’s requirement for “a product of human ingenuity
166
‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use.’” The Court, moreover,
distinguished as an eligible invention the claimed synthetic bacterium at
issue from the claimed novel combination of naturally occurring bacteria
that it had found to be ineligible in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo
167
Inoculant Co. In Funk Brothers, the patentee had “used that discovery
[of the noninhibiting effect of certain species of bacteria] to produce a
mixed culture capable of inoculating the seeds of leguminous plants,” but
the novel, human-produced culture was “only some of the handiwork of
nature,” “[n]o species acquire[d] a different use,” and the combination
“serve[d] the ends nature originally provided and act[ed] quite
168
independently of any effort of the patentee.” In contrast, the new
bacterium created by Chakrabarty had “markedly different characteristics
169
from any found in nature and . . . the potential for significant utility.”
The “markedly different characteristics” standard of Chakrabarty is
essentially the same as the non-analogous use requirement articulated in
Ansonia Brass. Unless the newly created thing is markedly different, it
might be novel but not meaningfully different; that is, it may be similar
and thus analogous. Unless markedly different, the novel product would
not reflect a sufficiently creative change to an existing thing as to convert
it into an invention. Further, the fact that the novel bacterium in
Chakrabarty possessed utility could not have been the feature or
requirement for eligibility that distinguished Funk Brothers. The Funk

163. Am. Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 8.
164. Id. at 11–12.
165. See id. at 13–14.
166. 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980) (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887))
(alteration in original).
167. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
168. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310 (emphasis added) (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131).
169. Id.
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Brothers combination, and other discoveries and inventions previously
found ineligible by the Court (including the treated fruit in American
170
Fruit Growers), possessed substantially improved practical utility.
Although the Court in Funk Brothers did not directly explain why
the novel combination at issue did not reflect sufficient creativity to
constitute a patent-eligible human invention, the Court’s treatment of
the scientific discovery of the noninhibiting effect of naturally occurring
bacteria provides an answer. As the Court noted, not only were the
qualities of the bacteria at issue not patentable because patents “cannot
171
issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature,” but also because
those qualities “like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of
metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are
manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively
172
to none.” As in Morse, the discovery of the qualities of the bacteria had
to be treated as if it were already known, even though the applicant
himself first made the discovery and thus added the knowledge to the
173
storehouse for the public to gain access to it. Once that discovery was
treated as if in the prior art, no sufficient creativity was required to apply
it to the particular useful result by merely combining the strains of
bacteria that were then (fictionally) already known to be noninhibiting.
Stated differently, the combination was neither a new thing with
markedly different characteristics nor a non-analogous use of the preexisting, and fictionally known, qualities of the bacteria, even if a nonnaturally occurring, novel, and useful combination resulted. The Court
thus specifically rejected the lower court’s view that making a “new and
different composition of noninhibitive strains which contributed utility
and economy to the manufacture and distribution of commercial
inoculants” was an “invention within the meaning of the patent
174
statutes.” And it said this at a time when the statute did not contain a
requirement for non-obvious invention, but only the eligibility standard
175
and its statutory categories.
Funk Brothers was decided shortly before the non-obviousness
176
requirement of patentability was first codified in the 1952 Act. As the
Supreme Court held in Graham v. John Deere Co., Congress clearly saw
the codification as a major change to the statute and as an opportunity
both to provide a new linguistic formula for the required creativity for
170. See Am. Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 8 (discussing the significantly improved mold resistance
resulting from treatment with ordinary borax).
171. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 116 (1853).
174. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130–31.
175. See 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1948).
176. See Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (adopting section 103)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006)).
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patentability—non-obviousness rather than invention—and to avoid
177
concerns raised by the language or certain precedents, while preserving
the same general level of creativity that had preceded enactment:
The major distinction is that Congress has emphasized “nonobviousness”
as the operative test of the section, rather than the less definite
“invention” language of Hotchkiss that Congress thought had led to “a
large variety” of expressions in decisions and writings. In the title itself
the Congress used the phrase “Conditions for patentability; non-obvious
subject matter” . . . thus focusing upon “nonobviousness” rather than
“invention.”
....
It is undisputed that this section was, for the first time, a statutory
expression of an additional requirement for patentability, originally
expressed in Hotchkiss. It also seems apparent that Congress intended
by the last sentence of § 103 to abolish the test it believed this Court
announced in the controversial phrase “flash of creative genius,” used
in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.
....
We believe that this legislative history, as well as other sources,
shows that the revision was not intended by Congress to change the
178
general level of patentable invention.

Nevertheless, the legislative history provides no suggestion that Congress
intended to change the then-existing law regarding patent eligibility in
179
any way except one.
In 1943, in In re Thuau, the Federal Circuit’s predecessor court had
departed from the Supreme Court’s Ansonia Brass precedent and had
held that all new uses of known things, even non-analogous uses—and
thus also all new uses of phenomena of nature, which had to be treated
as if already known—were unpatentable as not a new “art,” under the
180
eligibility language of the 1870 Act. Congress thus substituted the term
181
“process” for “art” in the new eligibility section 101, which it otherwise
left unchanged from the 1870 Act, and defined “process” in section
177. See generally Rich, supra note 25.
178. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14–15, 17 (1966) (emphasis added) (citing Cuno Eng’g
Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941)).
179. See H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952) (“[The language of the 1870 Act] has been preserved
except that the word ‘art’ which appears in the present statute has been changed to the word
‘process.’ . . . The definition of ‘process’ has been added in section 100 to make it clear that ‘process or
method’ is meant, and also to clarify the present law as to the patentability of certain types of
processes or methods as to which some insubstantial doubts have been expressed.”); id. at 17 (“The
remainder of the definition clarifies the status of processes or methods which involve merely the new
use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material; they are processes
or methods under the statute and may be patented provided the conditions for patentability are
satisfied.”); S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 4–5, 13 (1952); see also Pasquale J. Federico, Commentary on the
New Patent Act (1954), reprinted in 75 J. Pat & Trademark Off. Soc’y 161, 176–78 (1993).
180. 135 F.2d 344, 347 (C.C.P.A. 1943).
181. See Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 101, 66 Stat. 792, 797 (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
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182

100(b) to overturn Thuau and to restore the law of eligibility to its
183
prior state. In doing so, Congress also clarified in the legislative history
that the term “process” included pure methods, based on the Court’s
184
prior determinations that pure method patents were eligible.
Specifically, new section 100(b) provided that the statutory term
“process” means “process, art or method, and includes a new use of a
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
185
material.” Although this statutory language is broad, there is no
suggestion that the phrase “includes a new use” was intended to mean
“includes every new use,” eliminating the requirement for an “invention”
to reflect at least some creativity in any novel application. Section 101
continued to apply to persons who “invent or discover” one of the
statutory categories, and the change to the definition of “process” would
then have reflected a much more dramatic and fundamental change to
186
the meaning of these terms. In contrast, the legislative history indicates
that “invention” was defined to include “invention or discovery” only in
187
order to avoid repetition in the statute, and there is no suggestion
whatsoever that Congress intended such a radical departure from its
188
eligibility precedents.
Contemporaneous commentary also suggests that the statutory
language in section 100(b) was intended solely to restore the law to what
the Court had established in Ansonia Brass. As noted by Stefan Riesenfeld,
[T]he background of the amendment gives reason to assume that a
newly discovered use for a known substance, machine or process is still
only patentable if it is not merely analogous or cognate to the uses
heretofore made. . . . [I]t is fair to state that in essence the new
statutory definition of “process” restores the broad principles of
patentability flowing from a careful analysis of the exposition given by
189
the Supreme Court in the Ansonia case . . . .

Similarly, as noted by Pasquale Federico, one of the 1952 Act’s two
principal drafters,
The reference to the new use of a known machine or manufacture in
the definition merely means that processes may utilize old machines or
manufactures and the reference to the new use of a known process
simply indicates that the procedural steps in a patentable process might
190
be old.

182. See id. § 100(b), 66 Stat. at 797 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006)).
183. See, e.g., Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The New United States Patent Act in the Light of Comparative
Law I, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 291, 299–300 (1954).
184. See H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952).
185. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006).
186. Cf. supra note 25 and accompanying text.
187. See H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 16 (1952).
188. See Riesenfeld, supra note 183, at 299–300.
189. See id.
190. Federico, supra note 179, at 178.
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Had Congress intended to authorize as an eligible “invention or
191
discovery” even noncreative new uses of existing things, including newly
discovered natural phenomena, it almost certainly would have said so in
the legislative history. This is particularly true given the dramatic change
to the law that such an alteration would have reflected, and given that
the legislative history indicated that the only “major changes or
innovations” to the statute consisted of “incorporating a requirement for
invention in § 103”—following Hotchkiss and its numerous progeny—
and revising “the judicial doctrine of contributory infringement in
192
§ 271.” Nor would changing only the definition of eligible processes to
include new uses have altered the existing judicial standards for eligibility
of the other categories of subject matter (things), which were required,
per Hartranft and American Fruit Growers, to have “a distinctive name,
193
character [and] use.”
It is, of course, conceivable to impute to the 1952 Congress the
intent to make such dramatic changes to patent eligibility, if one ignores
194
the legislative intent, adopts a purely textualist reading of the statutory
categories of section 101, and leaves all questions of sufficient creativity
195
to the newly created non-obviousness provision of section 103. But no
Supreme Court decision since the 1952 Act has so construed the statute
in regard to applications of categorically excluded science, nature, and
ideas, and this interpretation is highly implausible for the reasons just
stated. In particular, the Court has continued in Benson, Flook,
Chakrabarty, Diehr, and Bilski to parse the creativity of novel
applications of science, nature, and ideas to determine if they are eligible
subject matter, notwithstanding their status as processes, machines,
manufactures, or compositions of matter, rather than deferring all such
196
questions to the obviousness inquiry under section 103.
Although this approach best corresponds to legislative intent, it is
also efficient and normatively justified given the prior-art treatment of
categorically excluded science, nature, and ideas, as discussed below.
Further, it mirrors international understandings of the patent system.

191. See Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 100(a), 66 Stat. 792, 797 (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2006)).
192. H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 5 (1952); see Karl B. Lutz, The New 1952 Patent Statute, 35 J. Pat.
Off. Soc’y 155, 162 (1953).
193. Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 13 (1931); Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121
U.S. 609, 615 (1887).
194. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 640–56 (1990);
John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 420–21 (2005).
195. Cf. Rich, supra note 25, at 29 (“[F]or the century following Hotchkiss v. Greenwood we had
what was called the ‘requirement for invention,’ which, I emphasize, we have not had for the past
twenty years. Instead we have § 103.”).
196. But cf. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 220 (1976) (avoiding eligibility arguments, but
reiterating the need to evaluate the differences between the prior art and the claim).
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The World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property does not define invention or distinguish
inventions from scientific, natural, and abstract discoveries, but requires
that patents “shall be available for any inventions . . . in all fields of
technology, provided they are new, involve an inventive step, and are
197
capable of industrial application.” This reflects that whatever creativity
is required for an eligible invention is not necessarily sufficient for an
inventive step, but that there cannot be an inventive step without an
eligible invention. Similarly, the European approach, under the
European Patent Convention (“EPC”), which explicitly excludes things
198
like ideas from being considered “inventions,”
requires for
199
patentability that an eligible “invention” reflect an “inventive step.” As
discussed below, however, the EPC applies the contributions of
categorically ineligible subject matter inconsistently for eligibility and for
patentability evaluations, allowing the creativity of newly discovered,
categorically excluded subject matter to contribute to eligibility but not
200
to an inventive step. Under the prior-art approach, the creativity of the
categorically excluded subject matter does not contribute to eligibility or
to patentability.
C. The Religious Origins of the Prohibition on Patenting
Discoveries and the Moral Obligation to Treat New Discoveries
as Prior Art
So where does this requirement to treat science, nature, and ideas as
prior art come from? The following discussion supplies a partial
historical account, starting with the post-Enlightenment, English
201
Protestant religious understandings brought to the United States. The
discussion is of American cultural and legal thought, although other
202
countries may have similar histories and doctrines.

197. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27(1), Dec. 15,
1993, 33 I.L.M. 81.
198. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 52(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 271, as
revised Nov. 26, 2000.
199. Id. at arts. 52(1) & 56.
200. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
201. See generally Sarnoff, supra note 48.
202. Cf., e.g., Tokkyoh [Japanese Patent Act], Law No. 121 of 1959, Art. 2(1) (“[‘Invention’ is] the
highly advanced creation of technical ideas utilizing the laws of nature.” (emphasis added)); Revision of
the European Patent Convention (EPC 2000) Synoptic Presentation EPC 1973/2000—Part I: The
Articles, 2007 O.J. EPO Spec. Ed. 4, at 48 (“[The 2000 revisions to the European Patent Convention,
Art. 52(1)] plainly expresses that patent protection is reserved for creations in the technical
field . . . [that] must therefore have a ‘technical character’ or, to be more precise, involve a ‘technical
teaching’.”); Dr. Kelvin W. Willoughby, How Much Does Technology Really Matter in Patent Law? A
Comparative Analysis of Doctrines of Appropriate Patentable Subject Matter in American and
European Patent Law, 64 Fed. Cir. B.J. 63, 75–124 (2008).
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John Locke began his analysis of property from the basic moral
equality of humans as God’s creatures of equal station, having “an equal
Right to the use of the inferior Creatures, for the comfortable
203
preservation of their Beings.” From this equal state of control over a
natural God-given commons, Locke derived a moral principle of equal
human regard from the typicality of the “God-given moral status” of
204
each individual. This equal regard forces each individual to take every
other individual’s duty of self-preservation as having universality,
205
anticipating the Kantian categorical imperative.
Locke famously developed the concept of human labor granting the
right to exclusive private appropriation of (private property in) nature,
which otherwise was given by God to all humanity as commons property
for all to share: “[T]hough the things of Nature are given in common, yet
Man (by being Master of himself, and Proprietor of his own Person, and
the actions or Labour of it) had still in himself the great Foundation of
206
Property . . . .” The reason that nature was understood as commons
property is that nature as such was not a human but a divine creation and
207
not subject initially to human control (dominion). Locke based his
natural law conception of property on a Biblical moral imperative for
productivity, which cultivation of land achieved: “Have a lot of children!
208
Fill the earth with people and bring it under . . . control.” And as with
one’s body, nature was God-given, which imposed inherent stewardship
209
obligations on the uses humans could make of nature.
As Justin Hughes has noted, Locke’s labor theory debatably may
depend on an assumption of “abundance” in nature, so that everyone
who labors can obtain “enough and as good” from the commons as
210
anyone else can obtain. This condition has been called Locke’s proviso,

203. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government § 87, at 243 (Peter Laslett ed., New American
Library 1965) (1689).
204. Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations of John Locke’s
Political Thought 155–57 (2002) (quoting 1 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding 94 (Alexander Campbell Fraser ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1894) (1690)) (citing
1 Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity § 8, at 80 (Arthur Stephen ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1989) (1593)).
205. Immanuel Kant, Ethical Philosophy: The Complete Texts of Grounding for the
Metaphysics of Morals, and Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, Part II of the Metaphysics of
Morals ¶ 421, at 30 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ. Co. 2d ed. 1994) (1785).
206. Locke, supra note 203, § 44, at 340–41.
207. See id. § 26, at 328.
208. Genesis 1:28.
209. See Sibyl Schwarzenbach, Locke’s Two Conceptions of Property, 14 Soc. Theory & Prac. 141,
145–47 (1988); see also Roberta R. Kwall, Book Review, The Author as Steward “For Limited Times,”
88 B.U. L. Rev. 685, 691–92, 700–08 (2008) (reviewing Lior Zemer, The Idea of Authorship in
Copyright (2007)).
210. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287, 297 (1988) (citing,
inter alia, Locke, supra note 203, § 27; Thomas Mautner, Locke on Original Appropriation, 19 Am.
Phil. Q. 259, 260 (1982)).
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211

or his sufficiency proviso. Further, after identifying the basis for private
property in labor where sufficiency (equivalency) can be maintained,
Locke immediately found limits on creating such property by
appropriating nature, articulating what has been called his “spoliation”
212
or waste proviso:
The same Law of Nature, that does by this means give us Property,
does also bound that Property too. . . . As much as anyone can make
use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much may he by his
labour fix a Property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his
213
share, and belongs to others.

For property in both acquired natural materials and enclosed land, to
exceed the boundaries of what could be productively used was “to
transform properly human liberty into license and thereby violate the
214
highest potential of the species.”
Unlike physical property, intangible ideas are not part of a
commons in the sense of an area capable of being depleted, but rather
are part of a metaphorical area. That area is both nonrivalrous and
expands, rather than is depleted, with use, and thus arguably always
215
meets Locke’s sufficiency proviso. For Locke, a person who “leaves as
216
much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all,”
and “unilateral acquisition . . . in circumstances of plenty . . . . pays
tribute to the underlying principle of equality by indicating that if the
interests of others are not prejudiced by my acquisition then there can be
217
no objection to it.” But for the sufficiency proviso to be met with
regard to property in ideas, the ideas subjected to appropriation must be
218
fungible and the property rights must not preclude similar ideas from
being used by others.
In general, the broader the idea is, the less likely it will be that any
similar idea will exist for others to use, either as an idea that already lies
within the intellectual commons or as a potential idea that might be
219
added to the commons by an initial inventor, and appropriator, of it.
For nonfungible ideas that are understood to preexist their discovery by

211. See, e.g., Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 175 (1974); Waldron, supra note 204,
at 172.
212. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 204, at 170; Hughes, supra note 210, at 325 (using the term
“non-waste condition”).
213. Locke, supra note 203, § 31, at 332.
214. Kristie M. McClure, Judging Rights: Lockean Politics and the Limits of Consent 94
(1996).
215. See Hughes, supra note 210, at 315.
216. Locke, supra note 203, § 33, at 333.
217. Waldron, supra note 204, at 172 (citing Locke, supra note 203, §§ 33–34, at 333).
218. See Hughes, supra note 210, at 336 (citing Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood,
34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 989–91 (1982)) (discussing fungibility in regard to Hegelian personality theory of
intellectual property).
219. Cf. id. at 323–25, 327.
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humans, the commons is necessarily diminished and others are
necessarily prejudiced by its exclusive acquisition and withdrawal from
use by granting exclusive rights. For preexisting science and nature and
for newly discovered and highly abstract ideas, “it is hard to imagine
anything ‘as good’ that could be left for others to discover. . . . [Some]
ideas are so fundamental . . . that allowing ownership in them would
violate the equality of creative liberty which the proviso also
220
embodies.” As recognized in Funk Brothers, these ideas are the
“storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . . free to all men and reserved
221
exclusively to none.” Or, in common patent parlance, some ideas simply
cannot be designed around, given the world we live in and the need to
make use of them or given their broad and basic nature. Thus, Locke’s
provisos implied at natural law a prohibition on the patenting of science,
nature, and abstract ideas—at least those that are believed to preexist
their discovery by humans or are otherwise nonfungible.
Assuming that certain categories of ideas were sufficiently similar to
be considered fungible, creating private property in them once they were
“appropriated” would not violate the sufficiency proviso. But the legal
inability of others to use or to build off of such ideas might still violate
Locke’s waste proviso. For Locke, the waste that may result from
creating property in ideas would not have been a loss so much of value to
222
the creator or to others as of productivity that might be made by
preventing others from using the ideas.
To avoid waste in produced physical goods, Locke depended on
trade in the money economy and the willingness of the property owner to
sell the unused surplus goods to others without involving “tremendous
223
reallocations of wealth toward the property holders of these ideas.”
Otherwise, possession of such property would “[deny] everyone . . . the
use of them by someone who has no use for them himself, or does not
224
propose to put them to human use.”
But providing private ownership of fungible ideas fails to account
adequately for the waste that results from their nonrivalrous and
nondepletable character. Market exchanges for all possible occurrences
or uses of science, nature, and broad, abstract ideas would seem
impossible, given their ability to be brought into existence and use
virtually anywhere.
Because sharing knowledge of God’s natural laws—science, nature,
and ideas—could not reduce the discoverer’s ability to employ them in

220. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533, 1581 (1993).
221. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
222. See Hughes, supra note 210, at 327–28.
223. See id. at 320.
224. Waldron, supra note 204, at 171.
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nature, the discoverer therefore had a moral, God-given duty to share
225
knowledge of nature that could increase cultivation by others, and not
merely to trade any surplus he or she might generate. This moral duty to
share information with others also followed from Locke’s effort:
[With Richard Hooker’s help to make a case] for the Golden Rule:
“Love thy neighbor as thyself” or “Do unto others as you would have
them do unto you.” . . . Richard Hooker’s argument cited by Locke in
section 5 of the Second Treatise is supposed . . . . [t]o show that once we
acknowledge that no human has a superior status, we have no choice
226
but to treat the needs and desires of others as on a par with our own.

Given equal concern for others, humans would similarly want other
discoverers to freely and widely share their information regarding nature,
so as to better assure self-preservation in accordance with God’s purposes.
The Golden Rule thus dictated creating the public domain of science,
nature, and ideas.
By the late eighteenth century, notwithstanding changing
theological conceptions and the growth of atheism, nature was
understood as “one grand, interrelated design, comprehensible by
227
rational investigation,” the understanding of which would benefit all
humans. During this period, invention was still understood in the
classical sense of uncovering something in nature that had been present
all along, through the mechanism of divine providence in permitting
228
human access to such knowledge. The divine creations of science,
nature, and broad abstract ideas that were revealed to humanity through
the efforts of scientists and philosophers, “those favoured mortals . . .
who share that ray of divinity which we call genius,” were thus intended
229
to be freely available. And “[i]f the inventor was no more than God’s
instrument in bringing His gifts to the community, then he could at most
230
claim user’s rights over them.”
Moreover, the divine origins of discoveries of nature, and their
initial status as commons property, imposed moral duties to freely share
knowledge of science, nature, and ideas. Scientists were “entrusted by
Providence with the delegated power of imparting to their fellow
creatures that instruction which heaven meant for universal benefit; they
must not be niggards to the world, or hoard up for themselves the

225. Cf. Robinson, supra note 49, § 25, at 39.
226. Waldron, supra note 204, at 155 (citing 1 Hooker, supra note 204, § 8, at 80).
227. Christine MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The English Patent System
1660–1800, at 203 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1988) (citing Robert Boyle, The Works of the
Honourable Robert Boyle (Thomas Birch, ed. 1744)).
228. See, e.g., id. at 198.
229. 17 The Parliamentary History of England col. 999 (T.C. Hansard 1813) (1774) (Lord
Camden).
230. MacLeod, supra note 227, at 198.
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231

common stock.” As Edward Walterscheid noted, the medieval belief
that “genius was a gift of God . . . largely precluded an earlier
development of the concept of intellectual property. For how could one
properly seek to obtain commercial value from that which was perceived
232
to have been granted by the grace of God?” Although times were
changing, they had not done so for patents on science, nature, and
ideas—and still have not done so.
The religion-inspired prohibition on owning science, nature, and
abstract ideas was well understood by the end of the eighteenth century,
as reflected in the fact that all of the judges in Boulton v. Bull
acknowledged that “mere principles” were not capable of being
233
patented. Thus, Joseph Bramah argued against Watt’s patent by stating
that the “works of men begin” at the point “where the independent
works of God end, who by his own secret principles and
methods . . . established the elements and their properties, and stocked
the universal storehouse” of endless changes producible by different
234
combinations and proportions.
Further, it was commonly recognized at that time that property
rights in functional ideas (inventions), unlike in literary authorial ideas
235
236
(published words), did not arise under natural law. Such invention
rights could exist only by the positive act of a government—through the
237
grant of patents—and were not otherwise recognized at common law.
Utilitarian philosophers in the late eighteenth century therefore felt the
need to articulate a call for government intervention to create rights to
238
inventions as incentives for their production and distribution. But these
positive law rights did not and, given contemporaneous deontological
moral beliefs, could not attach to the science, nature, and ideas
themselves, only to the creative human applications that the inventor had
actually discovered. And, as aptly put by the late nineteenth century
patent law scholar William Robinson, the religious prohibition on

231. 17 The Parliamentary History of England, supra note 229, at col. 999; see 1 William
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1765–6, at 8, 14.
39–40 (Univ. of Chicago 1979) (1766) (discussing moral duties to disseminate knowledge).
232. Walterscheid, supra note 47, at 39.
233. See (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651, 667 (Lord Eyre, C.J.).
234. MacLeod, supra note 227, at 220 (quoting Joseph Bramah, A Letter to the Rt. Hon. Sir
James Eyre, Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas (1797)).
235. In 1774, in Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L.), the English Parliament
reversed its earlier decision in Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.), that copyrights arose
at natural law. See generally Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (1968).
236. See, e.g., Walterscheid, supra note 47, at 203–04 (citing The Federalist No. 43 (James
Madison)); cf. Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. at 218 (Willes, J.); id. at 222 (Aston, J.); id. at 230–
35 (Yates, J.).
237. See Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 230–31 (Yates J.).
238. See Harold G. Fox, Monopolies and Patents: A Study of the History and Future of the
Patent Monopoly 204 (1947).
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creating such property and the obligation to share new discoveries
corresponded with the utilitarian goal of promoting progress, whether
understood as creative development or as dissemination: “To benefit by
the discoveries of his fellow-men is thus not only a natural right, it is also
the natural duty which every man owes to himself and to society; and the
mutual, universal progress thence resulting is the fulfillment of the
239
earthly destiny of the human race.” As described above, these
commitments have been preserved throughout the more than two
hundred years of American patent law doctrine; we continue to
recognize the exclusions for science, nature, and ideas as a matter of
240
stare decisis.
In summary, the prior-art treatment of newly discovered science,
nature, and ideas reflects long-standing and deeply held deontological
and utilitarian moral commitments to protecting the public domain and
to assuring its free availability and dissemination for the development
and use by the public of their many applications. The “invention in the
application” test and the “markedly different” and “non-analogous use”
standards for assessing eligibility protect the public domain by permitting
only different and sufficiently creative inventive concepts to be eligible,
thus preventing the piecemeal claiming of uncreative applications within
the public’s grasp, which would, in effect, claim the discoveries
themselves. Although the courts may not have specified (or consistently
imposed) the criteria for determining the degree and kind of creativity
that reflect markedly different characteristics or non-analogous uses,
they have yet to abandon this framework, even when unconsciously
241
applying or affirmatively resisting it.

II. Explaining the Relationship of the Exclusions for Science,
Nature, and Ideas to Patent Eligibility and
Patentable Invention
History reveals that the three categorical exclusions from patenteligible subject matter—for “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
242
abstract ideas” —and the need for more than “field of use” limits or
243
“token postsolution components,” define the boundaries of potentially
eligible “inventions” subject to the patentability requirements of the rest
of the statute. Additional policy guidance is needed to relate those other

239. Robinson, supra note 49, § 25, at 39. See generally Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed
to Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or
Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 Neb. L. Rev. 754 (2001).
240. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
241. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981); Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868–69 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
242. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
243. Id. at 3231.
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requirements to the invention requirement, and to inform the judgments
of similarity and difference required for establishing eligibility, as
markedly different characteristics or non-analogous uses (or new
inventive principles) of any newly discovered science, nature, and
244
ideas. This guidance cannot be supplied by the competing approaches
to eligibility that have been articulated by the courts and partially
supported by some scholars.
A. Mistaken Modern Approaches to Eligibility
Concern over “preempting” applications by patenting claims to
245
applications of science, nature, and ideas is both misleading and
unhelpful. Preemption is a misleading concept because the scope of a
claimed invention simply is not the relevant question for eligibility. As
Dolbear held, but Benson has called into question, so long as the claimed
application of a natural phenomenon is sufficiently creative, it may
246
preempt all physical means of creating or performing it. This is true
even if the claimed manner of application is the only way to achieve the
desired result and thereby covers all practical uses of a new scientific
discovery. Of course, it would be correspondingly unlikely that—once a
new scientific discovery became known and was treated as prior art—the
only practical use would be a sufficiently creative application.
Preemption is unhelpful because it changes the focus from the
nature of the invention for which patent protection is sought, and from
the requisite judgments of human creativity or similarity, onto the
consequence of granting protection; that is, it puts the cart of the
247
conclusion before the horse of one of its premises. Moreover, once
pure method patents are acknowledged as patent eligible, claim scope
determinations cannot supply the required distinctions between
ineligible natural discoveries and noncreative applications of them on the
248
one hand, and broad but inventive applications of them on the other.
Similarly, using the machine-or-transformation framework to assess
whether a claimed process invention employs a “particular machine” or
achieves a physical transformation of “a particular article into a different
249
state or thing”
is misleading and unhelpful. The machine-ortransformation framework misdirects attention to insufficient conditions

244. See supra Part I.A–I.B.
245. See supra notes 31, 45, 141–43 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 125, 136–41 and accompanying text.
247. Cf. Chisum, supra note 51, at 29 (arguing that in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972),
the Supreme Court extended the categorical exclusions from the “Invention Achievement Inquiry”
“through the ‘preemption’ concept to the Protection Scope Inquiry, as to which the intuitive appeal is
not so strong”).
248. See supra notes 116–32 and accompanying text.
249. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
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250

for eligibility. It fails to supply distinguishing criteria for the types and
uses of machines that can be creatively employed and thus distinguished
from mere (but physical) applications, or analogous uses, of newly
discovered science, nature, and ideas. The transformation framework
similarly fails to distinguish the kinds and degrees of physical
transformation that are sufficiently creative, as the different things may
not reflect markedly different characteristics or the different methods
may reflect only analogous uses. The machine-or-transformation
framework (but not the Supreme Court’s resistance to making it an
251
exclusive test ) also fails to recognize that specific machines or physical
transformations were required for Industrial Age creative applications.
The framework is the consequence of the legal standard applied to the
facts of that era rather than the imposition of a necessary condition.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, without adequately
explaining why, that the framework is overly prescriptive and that claims
252
not meeting the framework may nevertheless be eligible. In contrast,
although it has not explicitly stated that the framework is overly
inclusive, in that claims meeting the framework may nevertheless be
253
ineligible, the Court has in recent cases found method claims that
achieve useful transformations, including those that are physical, to be
254
ineligible.
The machine-or-transformation framework thus is not helpful in
preventing improper allowance of narrow but insufficiently creative
claimed applications of science, nature, and ideas, although it may help
255
to preclude the eligibility of overly broad and abstract claims. It may
also be insufficiently stringent if additional constitutional constraints
exist, based on defining the “useful Arts” (in contrast to liberal or
martial arts) in a manner that is not coextensive with the historic
256
requirements for “invention.”

250. See supra notes 40–41, 126–32 and accompanying text.
251. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226.
252. See id. at 3226–27 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978)).
253. See supra notes 159–69 and accompanying text; cf. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959–60 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (en banc) (discussing and disavowing the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test of In re
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), and of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
254. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231; Flook, 437 U.S. at 586 (noting the claim at issue for catalytic
conversion of hydrocarbons was useful in “a broad range of potential uses” in the petrochemical and
oil refining industries).
255. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963–65 (finding that a change in legal rights did not involve
the required machine implementation or an eligible transformation, although physical activity was
required to implement the claims).
256. See CASRIP Bilski Brief, supra note 67, at 18–19, 25 n.44 (suggesting that tests are needed based
on both protecting the public domain of science, nature, and ideas and on limiting patents to useful arts).
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257

Concern over reading the claim as a whole is also misleading and
unhelpful. The “claim as a whole” concern poses a straw man, because
dissection into claim elements was never a requirement for evaluating
258
eligibility. Rather, assessment of the inventive contribution in applying
259
the scientific discovery, or the “other inventive concept,” has always
been required for eligibility, just as the Supreme Court in Graham v.
John Deere Co. recognized the need to first determine the difference
between the claimed invention and the prior art before assessing whether
260
a claimed invention is obvious. Moreover, although reading the claim
as a whole is a predicate for evaluating the inventive contribution and for
determining into which of the statutory categories a claimed invention
falls, it does not reach the question of whether the inventive contribution
is sufficient for eligibility or whether the claimed “invention” is excluded.
This is true even when the claim as a whole falls within the language of
one of the statutory categories, whereas the categorically ineligible
discovery it applies may or may not fall within one of the statutory
261
categories, as with products of nature versus scientific principles and
262
abstract ideas.
Finally, it is important to understand that the exclusions from
patent-eligible subject matter are not merely long-standing judicial
“exceptions” from the broad statutory eligibility categories, as recently
263
suggested by the Supreme Court in Bilski. Rather, they define the very
heart of the American patent system—specifying when an eligible
“invention” has been created within the statutory classes of things and
264
processes enumerated in section 101. They reflect the absence of
fulfillment of the critical statutory requirement of section 101 that a
person “invents or discovers” one of the specified classes of subject
matter, and are not exceptions to those classes of subject matter. An
“exceptions” approach would suggest, under the relevant canon of
statutory construction, that the exclusions from patent eligibility should
265
be construed narrowly so as not to defeat legislative purposes. As

257. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
258. See supra notes 146–50 and accompanying text.
259. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.
260. See 383 U.S. 1, 13–18 (1966).
261. Categorically excluded products of nature are normally “compositions of matter.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2006).
262. Cf. Lemley et al., supra note 12, at 1328 (“[B]ecause patent claims almost never fall outside of
the four fundamental categories of § 101, when they do it is noteworthy.”).
263. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225–26 (2010); Chisum, supra note 51, at 32 (supporting
Bilski’s language because the “very nature of an ‘exception’ suggests that it should be applied
restrictively”).
264. See generally Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (1967) (discussing the
importance of gaps in statutory coverage to the statutory scheme and policies).
265. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989) (“[Where] a general statement of policy is
qualified by an exception, we usually read the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary
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articulated in Chakrabarty, “[i]n choosing such expansive terms . . .
modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated
266
that the patent laws would be given wide scope.” Congress took this
permissive approach to patent eligibility to ensure that “ingenuity should
267
receive a liberal encouragement.” Similarly, in Diehr, the Court noted
that it had “more than once cautioned that ‘courts should not read into
the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not
268
expressed.’”
As discussed previously, however, the exclusions from eligibility for
science, nature, and ideas—and for noninventive applications of them—
not only reflect the requirement of “invention,” they also are integral to
the purposes of the Patent Act and to the constitutional grant of
authority to grant exclusive rights for the discoveries of inventors because
269
they protect the public domain of science, nature, and ideas. These
“exceptions” reflect countervailing public rights of access that also
should be given “a large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure that
270
users’ rights are not unduly constrained.” These categorical exclusions
from eligibility and the requirement for additional inventive creativity in
their application should therefore be warmly embraced, rather than
grudgingly applied.
B. Protecting the Public Domain of Science, Nature, and Ideas
from Encroachment
Prior-art treatment of new scientific, natural, and abstract
discoveries makes a huge difference. It does so by precluding patents not
only on the new discovery itself, but also by rendering novel but
analogous (in other words, uncreative) applications of those discoveries
271
ineligible for treatment as inventions. Similarly, the new discovery

operation of the provision.”); Spokane & Inland Empire R.R. Co. v. United States, 241 U.S. 344, 350
(1916) (“[E]xceptions from a general policy which a law embodies should be strictly construed.”). Of
course, “two inconsistent canons can usually be found for any specific question of statutory
construction.” Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 807 (1983).
266. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
267. Id. (quoting 5 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 76 (H.A. Washington ed. 1871)).
268. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
269. See supra notes 47, 104, 201–31 and accompanying text.
270. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 (Can.) at 36, available
at http://scc.lexum.org/en/2004/2004scc13/2004scc13.pdf (discussing fair dealing for the purpose of
research under section 29 of the Canadian Copyright Act). Similarly, the experimental use
“exception” in patent law should not be considered an “exemption” from infringement subject to
narrow construction but rather a limit to the scope of the infringement right in the first instance. See
Henrik Holzapfel & Joshua D. Sarnoff, A Cross-Atlantic Dialog on Experimental Use and Research
Tools, 48 IDEA 123, 136 (2008).
271. See supra notes 155–75 and accompanying text.

Sarnoff_24 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

December 2011]

12/5/2011 11:32 PM

PATENT-ELIGIBLE INVENTIONS AFTER BILSKI

95

reveals that preexisting applications are not novel, as they are understood
to be inherently anticipated, although newly discovered science, nature,
and ideas are treated as prior art without regard to public benefit or to
statutory novelty categories such as knowledge or use by others or prior
272
making.
Treating new discoveries as known prior art and requiring
additional inventive creativity as the basis for a patent prevents the
advancement of knowledge inherent in the discovery itself from
supplying the required original creativity; this result may be a
273
constitutional requirement. Claims merely applying the discovery to a
new but analogous context would impermissibly exclude others from use
of the knowledge in that context, adding nothing further to the public’s
274
store of knowledge while “lay[ing] a heavy tax” on the public for uses
that should be free for all. For this reason, even Diehr acknowledged that
the ineligibility of new discoveries “cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit [their] use . . . to a particular technological
environment” and that “insignificant postsolution activity will not
transform an unpatentable [scientific or natural] principle into a
275
patentable process.”
Australian decisional law, by contrast, explicitly refuses to treat a
new discovery as publicly known prior art when considering the
creativity of claimed inventive applications, although the discovery itself
276
277
(“as such” in European terms ) remains categorically ineligible:
[An applicant’s] claim for a patent is not validly answered by saying
that, although there was ingenuity in his discovery . . . no ingenuity was
involved in showing how the discovery, once made, might be applied.
278
The fallacy lies in dividing up the process put forward as his invention.

272. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (g) (2006); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S.
242, 247 (1945); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711–12 (1880). To the extent that recent analysis of
the inherency doctrine suggests that prior public benefit (rather than mere existence of the attribute
later discovered) is the key to inherent novelty, the prior-art treatment of scientific and natural
discoveries may be understood as extending the relevant recipients of those prior benefits to nature
itself. Compare Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 371, 374, 379–81
(2005), with Todd R. Miller, Patented Compounds Inherently Coproduced as Trace Impurities: Issues
of Inherent Anticipation and Literal Infringement, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 425, 452–53 (2004).
273. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; see also Oskar Liivak, The Forgotten Originality
Requirement: A Constitutional Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 261, 273–
77 (2005).
274. Atl. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1882).
275. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981).
276. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 198, at art. 52(3); see id. art.
52(2)(a) (“The following shall not be regarded as inventions . . . : discoveries, scientific theories and
mathematical methods . . . .”).
277. See Nat’l Research Dev. Corp. v. Comm’r of Patents, (1959) 102 CLR 252, 278 (Austl.)
(agreeing with an earlier precedent that products of nature themselves are not patentable, regardless
of the fact that “the assistance of man may be invoked for their planting and cultivation”).
278. Id. at 252.

Sarnoff_24 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

96

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

12/5/2011 11:32 PM

[Vol. 63:53

In further contrast, a hybrid approach has been adopted under the
EPC. A “contribution” approach, similar to that of the United States,
279
was initially adopted under the EPC but was later abandoned.
However, the contributed knowledge of the discovery remains excluded
from consideration, if not necessarily treated as prior art, when
evaluating the “technical contribution” of the applicant for determining
280
the existence of an “inventive step” (that is, obviousness). But as the
EPC’s Board recognized, many have strongly criticized the choice to
permit categorically excluded discoveries to contribute to eligibility,
281
given that they do not contribute to patentability.
As articulated in Neilson, Morse, Flook, and now Bilski, new
discoveries of science, nature, and ideas must be treated as if they were
282
already known, prior art; that is, in the public domain. The question is
why we maintain this legal fiction, unlike our colleagues around the
world. Although Funk Brothers explains that such discoveries “are part
of the storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and
283
reserved exclusively to none,” no one knew what was in the storehouse
before the discovery was made. Thus, some reason other than a simple
prohibition on owning the knowledge itself must supply the basis for
treating such discoveries as known prior art.
Significantly, the reason for prior-art treatment is that patent law
does not exist to reward, and should not reward, scientific, natural, or
abstract discoveries, no matter how much money, effort, and creativity
went into making them or how much sacrifice went into disclosing
284
them. As one commenter noted in 1932, “[A] scientific discoverer is

279. See Opinion of the Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 003/08, ¶ 10.4 (European Patent Office
May 12, 2010), available at http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/
DC6171F182D8B65AC125772100426656/$File/G3_08_Opinion_12_05_2010_en.pdf.
280. Id. ¶ 10.5. Under the EPC “contribution” approach, categorically excluded subject matter
could not contribute the creativity or novelty to claimed applications for eligibility purposes. Id.
¶¶ 10.4, 10.5, 10.6. The EPC now permits eligibility for claims that employ a “technical means” or that
are a “technical product,” even if all novelty and creativity lies in the excluded discovery. Id. ¶¶ 10.6,
10.7. But it requires that any “technical effect” for an inventive step be reflected in a “technical
character” found in “all the features together” (and thus in the novel and creative application). Id.
¶¶ 10.7.1, 12.2.1. Where the only novel feature is nontechnical (in other words, in the categorically
excluded subject matter), the claim will not be patentable. See id. ¶¶ 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.13.1, 12.2.2,
13.5.1.
281. See id. ¶ 10.13 (“While the Enlarged Board of Appeal is aware that this rejection for lack of
an inventive step rather than exclusion under Article 52(2) EPC is in some way distasteful to many
people, it is the approach which has been consistently developed . . . .”).
282. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978);
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 115–16 (1853); Neilson v. Harford, (1841) 151 Eng. Rep.
1266, 1267–68.
283. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
284. Cf. Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, supra note 50, at 1222–23 (discussing the patent system’s
“normative bias against basic science” and the ability to modify that bias to “aid commercial
development and manufacturing with very specific uses that more immediately benefit the public”).
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not a creator, since he merely lifts the veil and discloses a principle or law
of nature which has always existed . . . . [A]ll the proponents [of rights in
scientific discoveries] recognize that the scientific discoverer should not
285
have any monopoly of his discovery.” Even in France—where, at one
point in the eighteenth century, the French had developed beliefs in the
286
natural law rights of inventors —concerted efforts made in the midtwentieth century to protect scientific discoveries directly through
287
patents or through droits d’auteurs ultimately failed. Nor does patent
law exist to reward such discoveries and recoup such investments through
288
eligible disclosed inventions that apply the discoveries. As noted above,
prior-art treatment protects the discovery from being rewarded and
289
constrained by piecemeal patent claims to uncreative applications.
Rather, patent law exists to reward the creativity only of eligible
principles of invention themselves, and the investments of money, effort,
and disclosure made in the creative applications alone. As Flook states,
patent-eligible inventions must reflect some “other inventive concept”
290
than mere application of the new discovery. It is the other inventive
concept, and only that concept, that is to be rewarded by a patent, and
the breadth of patent protection consequently should be coextensive

285. Holmes, supra note 23, at 1432; see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en
banc) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“Natural laws and phenomena can never qualify for patent protection
because they cannot be invented at all. After all, God . . . provided these laws and phenomena as
humanity’s common heritage. Furthermore, abstract ideas can never qualify for patent protection
because the Act intends, as section 101 explains, to provide ‘useful’ technology. An abstract idea must
be applied to (transformed into) a practical use before it qualifies for protection.”).
286. See C.H. Greenstreet, History of Patent Systems, in Mainly on Patents: The Use of
Industrial Property and Its Literature 13 (Felix Liebesny ed., 1972) (“[I]t would be a violation of
the rights of man in their very essence if an industrial invention were not the property of its creator.”
(translating the 1790 French patent law) (emphasis added)); MacLeod, supra note 227, at 199 (“The
National Assembly, in 1790, declared that ‘it would be a violation of the Rights of Man . . . not to
regard an industrial discovery as the property of its author.’” (quoting Frank D. Prager, A History of
Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 711, 756 (1944))); cf. Thomas M.
Meshbesher, The Role of History in Comparative Patent Law, 78 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 594,
607 (1996) (“[T]he French Revolution engendered a desire to base French patent law upon a natural
law, rights-of-man concept . . . but this idea acquired no supporters outside of France, and even the
French backed away from the idea four years later.”).
287. See, e.g., Hamson, supra note 23, at 20–29.
288. Federal Circuit Judge Newman has come close to articulating this competing vision in the
context of the written-description requirement. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d
1336, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Newman, J., additional views) (“[T]he threshold in all cases
requires a transition from theory to practice, from basic science to its application, from research plan
to demonstrated utility. . . . Basic scientific principles are not the subject matter of patents, while their
application is the focus of this law of commercial incentive. The role of the patent system is to
encourage and enable the practical applications of scientific advances, through investment and
commerce. . . . The practical utility on which commercial value is based is the realm of the patent
grant. . . .”).
289. See supra notes 23–24, 241 and accompanying text.
290. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978).
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291

therewith, as Dolbear confirms and as Benson less coherently sought to
292
establish. By remaining free from private patent property rights, the
293
discovery avoids acting as a pioneering “blocking patent”
that
dominates both the applicant’s and the public’s creative applications. The
categorical exclusions prevent claims to the discoveries themselves,
which would provide exclusivity over all “mak[ing]” of things employing
294
or “uses” applying the discoveries. But a claim for a noncreative
application of a discovery would effectively stake out the same territory,
just on a more limited scale. The creativity of making the discovery itself
would then impose patent costs on all claimed uses of the uncreative, but
more limited, application. In contrast, treating the discovery as if already
known avoids indirectly imposing patent-system costs on using the
discovered knowledge, both for ineligible uncreative and patentable
creative applications.
Direct patent-system incentives are thus prohibited for making and
disclosing new scientific, natural, and abstract discoveries. Nevertheless,
in some cases patent-system incentives for making and disclosing eligible
creative applications will prove sufficient for also making and disclosing
295
the ineligible discoveries. But even when they do not, the consequence
is not necessarily the underproduction or underdisclosure of scientific,
natural, and abstract discoveries, which is and should remain a serious
296
concern given that these discoveries are non-excludable public goods.
Rather, the consequences will depend on the adequacy of non-patent
297
incentives and funding to make and disclose such ineligible discoveries.
291. See, e.g., Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 534–35 (1888). Thus, although the “abstract
idea must be applied to (transformed into) a practical use,” it is the inventive concept in the
“transformation” and not the transformed idea itself that is protected. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
292. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972) (“[I]n practical effect [it] would be a patent
on the algorithm itself. It may be that the patent laws should be extended to cover these programs, a
policy matter to which we are not competent to speak.”).
293. Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1365 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing
Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1379 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839,
909–11 (1990).
294. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006); see also Holzapfel & Sarnoff, supra note 270, at 173 (discussing
“absolute” protection beyond conceived or disclosed embodiments or uses).
295. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031,
1032 (2005) (“[T]he effort to permit inventors to capture the full social value of their invention—and
the rhetoric of free riding in intellectual property more generally—are fundamentally misguided. In no
other area of the economy do we permit the full internalization of social benefits.”).
296. See generally Richard Cornes & Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public
Goods, and Club Goods 39–290 (2d ed. 1996); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Public Good, in
Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (I. Kaul et al. eds., 1999).
297. To some extent, these concerns reflect differences of faith in market and nonmarket
approaches to innovation. Cf. Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for
Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 1361, 1396–98 (2009) (citing, inter alia, Henry
E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 Yale L.J.

Sarnoff_24 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

December 2011]

12/5/2011 11:32 PM

PATENT-ELIGIBLE INVENTIONS AFTER BILSKI

99

These are not necessarily inadequate even though discoverers will not
obtain directly, through patent property rights, any social benefits of the
298
discoveries themselves. And even if underproduction or underdisclosure
were to result, contrary to historic beliefs in the confluence of utilitarian
299
and deontological grounds for limiting the patent system, the religious
and moral concerns engendered might nevertheless be more politically
300
salient.
In sum, without prior-art treatment or by otherwise permitting the
piecemeal claiming of noncreative applications of ineligible discoveries,
the discoverer effectively would be rewarded for the discovery itself. By
claiming either uncreative pure methods or many less broad but equally
uncreative specific applications, the applicant would approximate as a
matter of legal claim-drafting skill an ineligible claim to the discovery
301
itself. Determining ineligible subject matter based on preemptive scope
rather than on sufficient creativity therefore reflects, and has properly
been criticized for duplicating, concerns similar to section 112, paragraph 1
302
commensurability evaluations, in which the scope of the claim for
exclusion is measured against the scope of the inventive principle
303
described and enabled in the specification. But such duplication does
not exist for eligibility approaches focused on the required degree of
1742, 1748 (2007); Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 Va. L. Rev. 465, 466–71
(2004)) (discussing administrative costs and uniformity versus tailoring of intellectual property rights
through public or private ordering).
298. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & Econ. 293, 295
(1970) (discussing property rights and public goods production); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A.
Lemley, Spillovers, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 257, 272–73 (2007) (same); cf. Samuelson & Schultz, supra
note 47, at 117–20 (discussing as a criterion to determine abstractness the adequacy of market
incentives for creation of many business and service processes, the lack of significant R&D
investments, and diffuse and collaborative production).
299. See supra notes 238–39239 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 200–41 and accompanying text. See generally Shobita Parthasarathy, Breaking
the Expertise Barrier: Understanding Activist Strategies in Science and Technology Policy Domains,
37 Sci. & Pub. Pol’y 355 (2010).
301. The one potential limit to this is through the rare application of the reverse doctrine of
equivalents, where the claimed application is seen as so different that it should not be viewed as
applying the same inventive concept. See, e.g., Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S.
537, 557–67, 573 (1898); Merges & Nelson, supra note 293, at 860–68.
302. See, e.g., Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(Newman, J., additional views) (“[T]he patentee is obliged to describe and to enable subject matter
commensurate with the scope of the exclusionary right.”).
303. See, e.g., Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“[T]he Supreme Court [in Bilski] advised that section 101 eligibility should not become a substitute
for a patentability analysis related to prior art, adequate disclosure, or the other conditions and
requirements of Title 35.”); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (“If a claim is unduly broad, or if it fails to include sufficient specificity, the appropriate
ground of rejection is Section 112, for claims must ‘particularly point out and distinctly claim[]’ the
invention. . . . The filing of a broader claim than is supported in the specification does not convert the
invention into an abstraction and evict the application from eligibility for examination.” (internal
citations omitted)); see also supra note 51.

Sarnoff_24 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

100

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

12/5/2011 11:32 PM

[Vol. 63:53

creativity (although, as discussed below, duplication may exist with
regard to obviousness analysis).
While concerns over claim scope and preemption are significant and
warrant continued scrutiny, they address principally the proportionality
304
of both sides of the patent bargain equation (the “quid pro quo”),
rather than specifying the value and kind of disclosure qualifying as an
eligible invention in the first instance (the first side of the equation).
Unless such proportionality analyses are based ultimately on non-scope
policy factors—for example, deciding that exclusive rights incentives
simply are not needed for particular kinds of inventions, such as those
outside of the useful arts—they cannot support meaningful line drawing
for eligibility.
As recognized by the Supreme Court in both Diehr and Flook,
adding noninventive limitations to claims that restrict scope can avoid
preempting all applications; disclosing the full scope of what is claimed
will avoid disproportionality under section 112, but it cannot supply
305
eligibility to otherwise ineligible discoveries. Insignificant additional
structures, trivial physical transformations, field-of-use restrictions, or
other noninventive claim limitations may reflect legal skill, but they do
306
not impart patent eligibility. As Justice Breyer recognized in the
Laboratory Corporation case, artful drafting of such additional limitations
307
to the use of natural discoveries may add “nothing . . . of significance.”
Of course, where the claim is disproportionate to the inventive
contribution, it may fail both for lack of invention and on the overall
proportionality balance. Given that new discoveries must be treated as
prior art, it is no surprise that the preemption approach finds to be
ineligible claims that effectively exclude all uses of the new discoveries. It

304. Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1353–54 (“[Section 112, first paragraph] ‘ensure[s] that the scope
of the right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the inventor’s
contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification.’. . . It is part of the quid pro quo
of the patent grant. . . .” (quoting Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 920 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (citing Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002)))).
305. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 n.14 (1981) (“The claims [in Flook], however, did not
cover every conceivable application of the formula. We rejected in Flook the argument that because
all possible uses of the mathematical formula were not pre-empted, the claim should be eligible for
patent protection.”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 n.11 (1978) (“[I]t is not entirely clear why a
process claim is any more or less patentable because the specific end use contemplated is the only one
for which the algorithm has any practical application.”).
306. See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92; Flook, 437 U.S. at 590; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
70, 72 (1972).
307. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 138 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from dismissal of certiorari) (noting the restrictions on the claim’s scope and physical
transformations in performing the process); see Benson, 409 U.S. at 72 (referring to such artful claim
drafting as “direct attempts” to claim computer programs).
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is the more limited, uncreative applications that pose the greatest
308
problems regarding eligibility theories.
Similarly, the machine-or-transformation framework provides no
309
“clue” at all for making eligibility determinations, as it lacks any theory
of the function that “the patent laws were [and were not] designed to
310
protect.” The machine-or-transformation framework is thus incapable
of principled application, as well as underinclusive and overinclusive of
311
the requisite inventive creativity. In contrast, analogical reasoning from
past precedents, from which the machine-or-transformation framework
312
was derived, can help to suggest the kinds and degrees of required
creativity for eligibility. But analogic reasoning is helpful only when the
analogies are apt, which requires judgments of similarity of context that
may predetermine the outcomes. And in contexts thought to be nonanalogous, or markedly different, decisionmaking must be guided by
direct application of the relevant criteria.
The criteria for sufficient creativity must therefore be specified in
order to assess whether new types of claimed subject matter are eligible,
so that the patent system does not deprive the public of its rights to the
public domain of science, nature, and ideas; that is, unless and until
Congress deprives the public of such rights and the power to do so is not
313
found to be prohibited to it by the Constitution. In contrast, further
legislative (and possibly judicial) eligibility restrictions, unless made
substantially prospective in application, might pose constitutional takings
314
challenges.
C. The Actual Relationship Between Patent Eligibility and
Obviousness (and Other Patentability Doctrines)
Once one recognizes that both patent eligibility under section 101
and patentability under section 103 require inventive creativity, and that
even newly discovered science, nature, and ideas must be treated as prior
art, the relationship between patent eligibility and patentable non308. But see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
309. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 71).
310. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192.
311. See CASRIP Bilski Brief, supra note 67, at 21–29; supra notes 249–54 and accompanying text;
cf. Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 47, at 112–19 (discussing various “clues” to eligibility, based on a
range of different considerations designed to distinguish abstract ideas from eligible inventions, such
as level of abstraction, preemption, mental processes, wide-ranging impact, and the Constitution’s
“emphasis on promoting progress”).
312. See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text.
313. Cf. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011).
314. See generally Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envt’l Protection, 130 S. Ct.
2592 (2010); Davida H. Isaacs, Not All Property Is Created Equal: Why Courts Resist Applying the
Takings Clause to Patents, and Why They Are Right to Do So, 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1 (2007); Adam
Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the
Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 689 (2007).
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obviousness becomes apparent. If an application of newly discovered
science, nature, and ideas is not an “invention,” it also cannot be a “non315
obvious” invention. In contrast, it is possible for novel applications of
science, nature, and ideas to qualify as sufficiently creative inventions for
eligibility. Such inventions in theory might not qualify as non-obvious,
patentable inventions, if lacking the requisite kind or degree of creativity
to warrant granting exclusive rights. The Supreme Court in Graham,
however, suggested that Congress intended no change to the level of
inventive creativity required for patents when it created the nonobviousness standard of section 103 for application to prior art as defined
316
by section 102. Thus, any claim to categorically excluded subject matter
or any claim that lacks invention in applying such subject matter should
also necessarily be obvious, that is, so long as the categorically excluded
subject matter is treated as prior art for both eligibility and patentability.
Court statements and legal arguments that Congress intended section
101 to preserve broad eligibility and that section 101 should be construed
317
so as to effectuate that purpose thus miss the mark. There is simply no
point in preserving breadth of coverage under section 101 for what must
necessarily be unpatentable and obvious because it lacks any invention.
This is true even if the claims recite machines, manufactures,
compositions of matter, or processes.
The categorically ineligible subject matter thus makes no
318
contribution to the eligibility of the invention, and also should not
319
contribute to patentability when assessing obviousness.
Allowing
contributions to be considered for patentability but not for eligibility
(because section 102 does not define new but ineligible discoveries as
prior art) can only lead to patent-system errors. Such errors can arise by
granting patents on claims that, if the contributions do not matter, should
be considered both ineligible and unpatentable. Or they can arise by

315. Cf. Chisum, supra note 51, at 22–23 (noting that the Supreme Court in Bilski could have
relied on obviousness to reject the claims, as it did in Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976), and as it
could do for many “business methods and biomedical discoveries,” including claims resulting from
“the application of known techniques to isolate valuable biological subject matter”). Chisum, however,
did not discuss the prior-art treatment of the discovery, which may be what makes the application or
isolated material obvious.
316. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103(a) (2006); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); see
also supra note 178 and accompanying text.
317. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010); Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 867–68 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Brief for Petitioners at 18–20, Bilski v. Kappos,
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964).
318. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92 (1978) (“The process itself, not merely the
mathematical algorithm, must be new and useful. Indeed, the novelty of the mathematical algorithm is
not a determining factor at all.” (citing Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86,
94 (1939))); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,
333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
319. Cf. supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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excluding claims that, if the contributions do matter, should be
considered potentially eligible and patentable. Such errors are even more
likely when different levels of creativity are required for eligibility and
patentability, and it is hard to imagine why patentability could or should
require less creativity than is required for eligibility.
Given the inevitable unpatentability of claims lacking an eligible
invention, it also becomes evident that it is the prior-art treatment of
categorically excluded subject matter that really troubles those who
believe in an expansive patent system. Such believers would be no
happier if clearer legal rules of unpatentability for obviousness were
320
developed based on the prior-art status of such discoveries. But it is for
patent eligibility that the Supreme Court has encouraged the lower
321
courts to develop such rules. The Federal Circuit appears reluctant to
322
do so on its own, and we will see if they are willing to acquiesce in any
adjudicatory rules that the PTO may develop in the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences, so long as the PTO continues to lack
323
substantive rulemaking powers.
And unless they abandon the
preemption or machine-or-transformation approaches, the courts and the
PTO will continue to confront the prior-art status issue when addressing
the obviousness of claims that are found to be eligible.
The prior-art treatment of categorically excluded subject matter also
explains the relationship between section 101 and section 102, and
324
between section 101 and the first and second paragraphs of section 112.
In contrast, prior-art treatment does not resolve the question of how
much and what kind of additional “utility,” to the marked differences or
non-analogous uses required for an eligible invention, may also be
325
required for patentability under section 101.
Given that the
categorically excluded subject matter is treated as prior art, any claim to
such subject matter itself cannot be novel. Section 102, like section 101,
refers to “inventions,” and the lack of novelty for excluded subject

320. Cf. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Bilcare, KSR, Presumptions of Validity, Preliminary Relief, and
Obviousness in Patent Law, 25 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 995, 1027–30, 1041–43 (2008) (citing KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 505 U.S. 398, 416–17 (2007)) (discussing how the Supreme Court may have
created a conclusive legal rule or a presumption of obviousness for combinations of prior-art elements
shown to lack a new function); Keith Perine, Patent Overhaul Provisions May Complicate Tax
Preparation, CQ Today (Feb. 2, 2011) (discussing opposition to legislation proposing to treat tax
liability methods as prior art for the purposes of obviousness analysis, which purportedly would
adversely affect innovation, investment, and competitiveness in the financial software products
industry (quoting Rey Ramsey, President of the TechNet coalition)).
321. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229.
322. See Research Corp. Techs., 627 F.3d at 868.
323. See, e.g., Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 328 Fed. App’x 658
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
324. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 112 ¶¶ 1, 2 (2006).
325. Cf. Risch, New Uses for Patent Utility, supra note 32, at 5–10 (discussing operable, practical,
and commercial usefulness, and timing and measurement issues in assessing utility).
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matter exists without regard to the specific listed events that would
otherwise be required to place such knowledge in the public domain (for
326
example, “known or used by others”). Once the applicant discloses the
knowledge of the discovery in the patent application, the public
effectively receives the benefit of that knowledge retroactively, at least
for science and nature, which are inherent to the world; the applicant
327
therefore cannot be considered the first inventor of such knowledge.
Claims reflecting applications of the newly discovered science, nature, or
ideas in previously existing products or processes that had unknowingly
incorporated them, moreover, would lack any novel invention based on
traditional inherency doctrine.
The mismatch between an insufficient inventive disclosure and the
exclusive breadth of a claimed application is traditionally policed by
section 112, paragraph 1, through the written-description and enablement
328
requirements. As noted by the Supreme Court in Morse, because
claims to categorically excluded subject matter are not the claimants’
inventions, they also cannot legally be “described” as “invented” by the
329
applicant. Thus, such claims may violate both sections 101 and section
330
112. But the same is true for noninventive applications of science,
nature, and ideas, which also are not “inventions.” Conversely, so long as
the description and claim match the applicant’s actual invention, which
permissibly may include only sufficiently creative applications of newly
discovered science, nature, and ideas, neither section 101 nor section 112

326. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
327. See supra note 272 and accompanying text; cf. Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville
Co., 270 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1926) (discussing the defense in the predecessor act that the applicant was
not the “first inventor,” and noting that a description filed in an earlier patent application by another
can “show[] that [the current applicant] was not the first inventor,” which rule was subsequently
codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)).
328. See, e.g., Vincent Chiapetta, Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an “Article of
Manufacture:” Software as Such as the Right Stuff, 17 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 89, 164
(1998) (discussing “two different kinds of abstraction,” failure to put to any practical use, and
vagueness, with the latter relating to how (rather than in what context) to implement the claim and
triggering section 112 paragraph 1 enablement concerns); Chisum, supra note 51, at 21 (“The purpose
of the [written-description requirement] . . . is very similar to that given by the Supreme Court in
defense of the Section 101 ‘abstract-ideas’ exception. . . . [precluding] patents for (1) ‘basic
research, including research into scientific principles and mechanisms of action,’ as opposed to ‘the
practical implications of . . . such research,’ (2) ‘for academic theories, no matter how groundbreaking
or necessary to the later patentable inventions of others’ and (3) ‘research plans,’ which ‘impose costs
on downstream research.’” (quoting Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (en banc))); Chisum, supra note 51, at 19 (noting that enablement is the “primary claimscope regulator”); supra note 135 and accompanying text.
329. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853) (“In fine he claims an exclusive right to
use a manner and process which he has not described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could
not describe when he obtained his patent.” (emphasis added)).
330. See, e.g., Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 257 (1928) (“That the
patentee may not by claiming a patent on the result or function of a machine extend his patent to
devices or mechanisms not described in the patent is well understood.”).
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written-description requirements should pose any constraint on patent
331
eligibility or on patentability. Nevertheless, such descriptions might not
enable others to make and use the full scope of the claimed eligible
invention, under whatever is the proper standard of permissible
332
“experimentation” required to do so.
Indefiniteness under section 112, paragraph 2, is sometimes raised as
a concern, particularly in regard to the eligibility of claims applying
333
abstract ideas. As with written description, so long as the claims are
limited to creative applications that are clearly claimed, neither
definiteness nor eligibility should be an issue. In contrast, even creative
applications may not be clearly claimed, and indefiniteness concerns may
remain. Definiteness thus is not a substitute for eligibility analysis.
Further, claims to categorically excluded subject matter and to
noncreative applications thereof are not claims for “inventions,” and thus
the claims may not objectively match what the applicant “regards as his
invention,” even when their subject matter is susceptible to being
334
“particularly point[ed] out and distinctly claim[ed].”
In sum, section 101 establishes the subject matter of claims that
qualify as patent-eligible “inventions,” rather than as categorically
ineligible discoveries and noncreative applications of them. It is these,
and only these, inventions that are supposed to be measured against the
prior art (which includes newly discovered but ineligible discoveries) for

331. See, e.g., J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 133–35 (2001)
(noting that the Plant Patent Act was not meant to exclude plant protection under the predecessor to
section 101, even though plants were not then thought to fall within that provision); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 311–12 (1980) (noting that before 1930, artificially bred plants were
thought to be both products of nature and incapable of an adequate written description, and that the
Plant Patent Act changed the view of their status and relaxed the written-description requirement).
332. Cf., e.g., Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1367 (Linn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(citing In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (noting the current “undue experimentation”
standard of enablement, requiring commensurability assessments for the making and use of the claim
by others); see also Sarnoff, supra note 135, at 466–67 (discussing The Incandescent Lamp Patent at
issue in Consolidated Electric Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465 (1895), and discussing
Holland Furniture Co., 277 U.S. 245).
333. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the Federal Circuit Bar Ass’n Urging Reversal, In re
Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (No. 95-1054), reprinted in 5 Fed. Cir. B.J. 107, 117 (1995)
(citing Application of Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970)) (encouraging the court to decide
section 112 definiteness before reaching section 101 eligibility for means-plus-function claims); Wesley
L. Austin, Software Patents, 7 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 225, 245 (1999) (discussing one claim rejected by
the PTO for indefiniteness while others were rejected as ineligible for abstractness in In re
Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1358–60 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); cf. Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[A] patent that presents a process sufficient to pass the
coarse eligibility filter may nonetheless be invalid as indefinite because the invention would ‘not
provide sufficient particularity and clarity to inform skilled artisans of the bounds of the claim.’”
(citing Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008))).
334. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (2006); see Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (generally requiring objective evidence, rather than subjective inventor testimony, to assess
what the applicant regarded as the invention).
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novelty under section 102; for obviousness under section 103; and under
section 112 for commensurability of the disclosure of that invention to
the breadth of claimed exclusion, for conformity to the applicant’s
subjective understanding, and for precision of claims in supplying public
understanding and notice. Claimed noncreative applications of science,
nature, and ideas will remain ineligible and unpatentable because they
are not inventions or discoveries within the meaning of the statute, even
though they are novel, not inherent in section 102-defined prior art,
sufficiently described, capable of being made and used by others, and
limited to what the applicant believed was inventive and clearly claimed
to supply public notice. Section 101 thus performs a role that sections 102
and 112 cannot. In contrast, so long as new discoveries are treated as if
they were prior art, section 103 necessarily should also render ineligible
uncreative applications unpatentable as obvious. But there are good
reasons to rely on threshold eligibility determinations rather than
obviousness decisions to keep these claims out of the patent system.

III. The (Mostly) Utilitarian Benefits of Threshold Eligibility
Exclusions and Clearer Criteria
Three general kinds of efficiency benefits are provided by applying
335
section 101 eligibility criteria as a “threshold” determination. These are
reduced costs of administration, reduced overall burdens on the patent
system, and clearer signals that direct investment and innovation to
activities that most need patent-system incentives while better protecting
336
the public domain of science, nature, and ideas from encroachment.
Given broader recognition of the prior-art treatment of categorically
excluded discoveries and the consequent need for invention in their
application, these benefits should become more transparent. Objections
to using categorical eligibility rules in a gatekeeping role based on the
perceived duplication or on the asserted superiority of other patentability
337
criteria, and particularly arguments based on the ability to further
develop the factual record during search and examination so as to make
338
better judgments, simply fall wide of the mark. And, given recognition
of the need for invention in the application, so are objections that relying

335. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 213
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189–90 (majority opinion) (noting that section
101 decisions on eligibility are separate from determinations of the “conditions and requirements” of
patentability).
336. See infra Parts III.A.–C.
337. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text; cf. Risch, Forward to the Past, supra note 17, at
364 (noting arguments for eligibility as a “proxy” for other criteria, and criticizing such arguments for
failing to provide accurate rules for determining which claims should be disallowed).
338. See, e.g., Chisum, supra note 51, at 31.
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on threshold eligibility determinations will keep out of the patent system
339
particular claims or “entire areas of invention” that should be allowed.
First, because determining the existence of an “invention” is a
predicate to most subsequent patentability determinations, eliminating at
the outset claims that lack the minimally required creativity for invention
is typically an easier and more efficient determination, which will reduce
overall burdens of evaluation on the patent system. Thus, the practical
effect of eligibility doctrine could and should be to exclude and
discourage many claimed applications in fields in which invention
340
requires more creativity than is routinely supplied. Making such
threshold eligibility determinations will not result in wasted effort so long
as resorting to an eligibility determination is not required when rejection
341
on other grounds is clearly more efficient. Second, such eligibility
determinations will discourage the filing of claims for applications
reflecting more clearly identified insufficient creativity, which will then
provide the benefit of reducing the overall burden on the patent system.
Third, and relatedly, excluding at the threshold insufficiently creative
claims will send the right signals to direct investment, effort, invention,
and disclosure towards more creative, and thus also potentially
patentable, activities. This should lead to more rapid development of the
prospects marked out by the discovery and disclosure of the categorically
342
ineligible science, nature, and ideas. Each of these sets of benefits is
briefly discussed below.
Of course, this only raises the more significant question of whether
mere applications of new discoveries should be allowed to be patent
eligible and patentable. Eliminating prior-art treatment of categorically
excluded discoveries arguably might better encourage the identification
of such discoveries and consequent development of both creative and
uncreative applications, providing the public with concrete social
343
benefits. Similarly, the exclusions for science, nature, and ideas might

339. Lemley et al., supra note 12, at 1342.
340. Cf. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3253–55 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing constitutional concerns
with granting patents on business methods given arguments against the necessity for further
encouraging business innovations); supra note 298.
341. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (noting that there is no
requirement to address section 101 analysis before rejecting on other grounds, but “given that § 101 is
a threshold requirement, claims that are clearly drawn to unpatentable subject matter should be
identified and rejected on that basis”).
342. See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 293, at 843 (providing a theoretical and empirical
analysis of “whether technical advance proceeds more vigorously and effectively under competition or
under a regime where one person or organization has a considerable amount of control over
developments”); id. at 843–44 (“[T]he law should attempt at the margin to favor a competitive
environment for improvements, rather than an environment dominated by the pioneer firm.”). See
generally John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and
Sequential Innovation, 65 Antitrust L.J. 449 (1997).
343. See, e.g., Lemley et al., supra note 12, at 1329 (“The abstract ideas exception should disallow
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be abandoned on the belief that centralized rather than decentralized
development of fundamental discoveries will lead to greater scientific
344
and technological progress, or beliefs that section 101 decisions should
be based solely on whether the claim “forecloses” (preempts) too much
345
“follow-on-invention.”
Such approaches raise more fundamental
innovation-policy challenges to the eligibility rules of the current patent
system, and lead to questions about how society will fund the basic
research and development that currently results in the public domain,
prior-art treatment of science, nature, and ideas.
The effects of the patent system on innovation—and of particular
exclusions from it or of particular levels of protection provided by it—are
346
highly uncertain and contested. Particularly in regard to the issue of
business method eligibility, two economists recently argued to the
Supreme Court in Bilski that
[e]conomic research has shown that the relationship between patent
protection and innovation is complex . . . .
....
Economic evidence indicates that the social costs of business
method patents are significant and the social benefits are small
compared to those costs.
....
Empirical evidence reveals both negative and positive effects of
patents on the pace of cumulative innovation.
....
There is at present very little evidence to argue that business method
patents have had a significant effect on the R&D investments of
financial institutions.
....

those claims to ideas unmoored to real-world applications.”).
344. See, e.g., Risch, Everything Is Patentable, supra note 14, at 591–93. But cf. Chisum, supra note
51, at 29. (“Who can object to barring patents when all the ‘inventor’ contributes is formulation of an
abstract idea or discovery of a natural phenomenon?”). See generally John F. Duffy, Rethinking the
Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 439 (2004); F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and
Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream
Access, 56 Emory L.J. 327 (2006); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System,
20 J.L. & Econ. 265 (1977).
345. Lemley et al., supra note 12, at 1329–30; see id. at 1339–41 (discussing industry and claimspecific factors regarding such preclusion).
346. See, e.g., Machlup, supra note 61, at 14, 56, 62, 80; Risch, Everything Is Patentable, supra note
14, at 594 (“[I]t is simply too hard to identify, let alone measure the effect of subject matter rules on
innovation.”); Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Patents and Progress: The Economics of Patent Monopoly and Free
Access 1, 10 (July 21, 2008), available at http://www.nyls.edu/centers/harlan_scholar_centers/
institute_for_information_law_and_policy/publications/ (discussing inconclusive studies conducted
since Fritz Machlup and since Kenneth Arrow’s similarly inconclusive theoretical analysis). See generally
John R. Thomas, Cong. Research Serv., 7-5700, Current Issues in Patentable Subject Matter:
Business Methods, Tax Planning Methods, and Genetic Materials 13–15 (2011) (discussing and
surveying recent analyses and arguments for and against expansive patentable subject matter).
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Empirical studies indicate that software patents have not stimulated
software research.
....
There is little evidence that [patents induce firms to disclose inventions
347
that would otherwise be kept secret] significant[ly or at all].

But whatever the merits of these arguments about areas of endeavor, the
benefits and risks of extending the patent system to fundamental
knowledge poses more serious concerns. This is because of the breadth
of potential, and potentially unknown, applications of those discoveries.
As discussed above, the categorical exclusions for science, nature,
and ideas were adopted specifically to protect and promote such
fundamental discoveries; prior-art treatment prevents imposing the costs
of funding those discoveries on both the uncreative and the creative
applications that patents on such fundamental knowledge would
348
dominate. Eliminating the categorical exclusions or their prior-art
status is thus a very high-risk utilitarian innovation strategy.
Further, innovation policy is not the only, and may not be the most
significant, value at stake. There is an integral relationship of the
exclusions for science, nature, and ideas to historic religious beliefs
regarding nature and the role humans play in understanding and shaping
349
it. As noted above, these concerns may be incommensurable with
350
utilitarian morality, but they are no less significant politically.
Eliminating the categorical exclusions or their prior-art status would
extend the patent system well beyond its current and already highly
controversial limits. It might permit patents on nature itself, including
human biology, or on all sorts of other knowledge for which there may
351
be no, or wholly inadequate, substitutes or design-arounds. It also
352
might create the equivalent of patent thickets with a single patent, no
matter how creative synthetic biology and bioinformatics, theoretical

347. Brief Amici Curiae of Professors Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer in Support of
Respondent at 30–32, 36–38, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964) (citations omitted).
348. See supra notes 293–94 and accompanying text.
349. See Sarnoff, supra note 48 (discussing why deontological moral concerns continue to matter
for patent eligibility decisions).
350. See supra notes 53–58, 300 and accompanying text.
351. See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting
the incentive to design around patents as an incentive to bring useful innovations to the market); Craig
A. Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 Ind. L.J. 759, 760 (1999) (discussing the
relationship of design-arounds and competition); supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text.
352. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698, 700 (1998) (arguing that the grant of too many
patents is causing licensing failures). But see, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent
Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1677, 1679, 1685
(2007) (discussing data on biotech patents that suggest the lack of anticommons problems). See
generally Michael A. Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks
Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives (2008).
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physics, nanotechnology, and other areas of research and development
353
become.
These moral concerns are salient. Congress quickly reversed a
judicial decision holding that using a patented invention to obtain
approval for competitive pharmaceuticals infringes the exclusive rights of
354
a patent. Under current experimental-use doctrine, however, there may
be a gap in legislative protection of the drug development process,
allowing a patent holder to block medical product research and
development at the point between nonprohibited basic research and
355
excepted medical-approval research. Further, recent court decisions have
limited the patent-rights exception to patents on potentially approvable
materials, rather than to all patented materials (particularly research
356
tools), used in such research. Similarly, Congress reacted quickly to
protect doctors and hospitals from being sued for infringement of medical
357
and surgical method patents, even if it did not thereby protect patients or
358
other medical service providers (who may act as the agents of doctors).
Prudence, or responsibility, thus counsels against adopting dramatic
359
changes to patent eligibility, given the high risks for innovation policy
and the religious and moral concerns that would be triggered by
changing the historic, strong protection for the public domain of science,
nature, and ideas. Legislative action to further expand (rather than
360
contract) the patent system seems unlikely for the present, even if the
361
Supreme Court removes any constitutional restriction on such action,
and the Court appears willing to preserve the current limits as a matter
362
of stare decisis.

353. For the same reason, the experimental use exception should protect efforts to use disclosed
knowledge not only to perform basic research on but also research with patented inventions, even
where physical access to the patented invention (precluded making or use) is needed to do so. See
Holzapfel & Sarnoff, supra note 270, at 165–66; cf. Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public
Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 81, 86–88 (citing Embrex, Inc. v.
Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1343–49 (Fed. Cir. 2000)) (discussing concerns with prohibitions on
using patented inventions in order to design around them).
354. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006); Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193,
205–08 (2005).
355. See, e.g., Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 877 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting); Brief of Amici Curiae Consumer Project on Technology, Electronic Frontier
Foundation and Public Knowledge in Support of Petitioner at 2–3, 6–11, 20–30, Merck KGaA v.
Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No. 03-1237).
356. See Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1262–64 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
357. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2006).
358. Cf. Brief Amicus Curiae of AARP in Support of Petitioner at 9–10, Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (No. 04-607).
359. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
360. Cf. supra note 57 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
362. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
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A. Reduced Costs of Search and Better Evaluations and
Disclosures
Given the requirement to treat new discoveries of science, nature,
and ideas as if they were prior art, determining the eligibility of claims
applying such discoveries should be simpler and more efficient than
determining the patentability of these and other types of claimed
inventions. This is because the required creativity and other inventive
concept should—if the applicant has provided the required written
363
description of the invention —be apparent from the disclosure in the
application’s specification. Thus, threshold elimination of claims for
which the specification discloses an insufficiently creative invention or
fails to disclose any sufficient one should avoid more detailed scrutiny.
Facial evaluation of such insufficiency may avoid the need to search for
prior art and to consider novelty under section 102, given the publicdomain status of the discovery or other disclosed knowledge of its
inherency. Similarly, it may avoid the need to consider obviousness
364
under section 103 (including objective factual indicia thereof). Facial
evaluation also may render moot any consideration of the sufficiency of
the description to demonstrate “possession” of the invention under
365
section 112, paragraph 1. Finding such claims ineligible also may avoid
enablement-determination errors under section 112, paragraph 1, given
that commensurability of claim scope may be unclear, but the initial
366
burden of establishing a lack of enablement rests on the PTO.
In contrast, if the disclosure fails to clarify whether the claim
identifies a sufficiently creative application but the claim is not rejected
outright for ineligibility or for lack of written description, additional
system costs must be incurred. These include searches and evaluations to
367
determine the point of novelty of the claimed invention as a whole, in
light of known or newly discovered but ineligible science, nature, and
ideas. In such cases, eligibility determinations should be simpler, and
thus less costly and more accurate, than for most other patentability
368
evaluations. This is because eligibility requires only identifying what

363. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006).
364. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
365. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(“[T]he specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that
the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.”).
366. See, e.g., In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561–62 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
367. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
368. In contrast, determinations that claims are indefinite under section 112, paragraph 2, may be
simpler than determinations of eligibility, as the former require assessing only whether the scope of
the claim is sufficiently intelligible to understand its limits without litigation to impose such limits,
while the latter require assessing whether that scope corresponds to the claimant’s disclosed inventive
contribution to the art. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Consumers Union, et al. in Support of
Defendants-Cross-Appellants at 4–9, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
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the inventions consist of and assessing them for minimal creativity of the
relevant kind, whereas the existence of such an invention, and of its
nature, is only a necessary, partial predicate for most other patentability
369
determinations. These other determinations require additional, and,
given resource constraints, at least equally suspect investigations and
determinations, but the effort expended in evaluating threshold eligibility
will not be wasted in making them.
For example, novelty decisions under section 102 require, in
addition to identification of the inventive contribution beyond any
ineligible new discovery, evaluation of the level of its publicity or use by
the applicant or public access to comparable information invented by
370
others. Both sets of information are needed to determine if the
applicant should be considered the first person to provide the public with
371
the specific contribution claimed.
Similarly, non-obviousness
determinations under section 103 require, in addition to identification of
the kind and degree of creative contribution, evaluation of the height of
the inventive step under potentially more stringent requirements for
creativity, while also balancing, in some unspecified fashion, objective
372
historical and market indicia of non-obviousness, as well as possibly
373
measuring the usefulness of the contribution. These criteria and
(Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286).
369. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Inventions patentable[:] Whoever invents or discovers
any . . . subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”); id. § 102 (“A person shall be entitled
to a patent unless—(a) the invention . . . (b) the invention . . . .”); id. § 103(a) (“A patent may not be
obtained though the invention . . . .”); id. § 112 ¶ 1 (“The specification shall contain a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of using it . . . .”).
370. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)–(g) (2006).
371. See, e.g., Margaret L. Begalle, Eliminating the Totality of the Circumstances Test for the Public
Use Bar Under Section 102(b) of the Patent Act, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1359, 1359–61 (2002) (discussing
factors historically affecting public use and on-sale determinations) (citing Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc.,
525 U.S. 55, 67–68 (1998)); Note, Novelty and Reduction to Practice: Patent Confusion, 75 Yale L.J.
1194, 1194–96 (1966) (noting the “basic policy” of rewarding only the first inventor to “place the
[knowledge] in the public domain” so that the knowledge is “made available to the public”). Of
course, in most novelty determinations under section 102, that is, those other than applications of new
discoveries of science, nature, and ideas, a substantial part of the applicant’s contribution to public
knowledge will not be treated as prior art. But once the search for third-party art is performed and an
assessment has been made that it is in the public domain (after considering evidence regarding the
dates of invention and filing), the determination of the applicant’s creative contribution is comparable
to the first step of the eligibility evaluation. Unlike for eligibility evaluation, however, under section
102 no assessment of sufficient creativity is needed. Rather, section 102 requires further assessment of
whether (at the time of filing) that prior art was enabling of at least one embodiment of the claim. See,
e.g., Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Sean B.
Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 Duke L.J. 919, 932–36 (2011).
372. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416–27 (2007) (discussing different
approaches to assessing obviousness); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (discussing
comparisons to prior art, evaluation of contribution, and objective indicia of non-obviousness); see also
Sarnoff, supra note 320, at 1003–07, 1036–43 (discussing presumptions generally and the effects of the
KSR decision on obviousness evaluations).
373. See, e.g., Risch, New Uses for Patent Utility, supra note 32, at 21 (“Usefulness is a potential
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measures are not self-evident and also require search and complex
evaluations. Written-description and enablement decisions under section
112 require evaluating the comparability of the identified creative
contribution to the scope of exclusion that the claims would grant. To do
so requires objectively assessing from the disclosure either subjective
possession of the applicant of what has been identified as objectively
claimed, or from the specification and from extrinsic evidence what a
notionally skilled person would be capable of doing with the information
374
under an uncertain standard of experimentation.
Further, more rigorous application of categorical eligibility
exclusions and clearer articulation of the required kinds and degrees of
creativity may induce applicants to supply clearer specifications that
better disclose the nature of their creative invention, so as to avoid
rejection on either eligibility or written-description grounds. In turn, this
may further reduce costs to the patent system, not only of making these
determinations and other patentability evaluations but also by assisting
better claim construction decisions. This would help to reduce the
chilling effects on competition resulting from uncertain claim boundaries
and to reduce the costs of reexamination and litigation (given clearer
375
predictions and bases for judgment). Applying section 101 more firmly
and clearly at the threshold thus not only may remove invalid claims
more efficiently and effectively, but also may reduce overall costs and
simultaneously improve the quality of the patents that ultimately issue
from the system.
Significantly, the most common argument raised against the
threshold application of eligibility criteria is overbreadth: that they are
blunt instruments that will preclude the more precise, case-by-case
evaluations under patentability criteria that would demonstrate that the
376
claimed applications are patentable. But even if this concern were to
have some force (for example, if eligibility decisions were based on
innovation policies that categorically excluded particular areas of
endeavor, rather than on policies that protect the public domain by
requiring a minimal level of creative invention in the claimed
application), the efficiency benefits of categorical exclusions might
nevertheless outweigh the error costs of removing patentable claims

guide for determining whether an invention is a sufficient improvement on the prior art to be
patentable.”).
374. See supra notes 332, 365.
375. See, e.g., United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942) (requiring
claims to “clearly distinguish . . . what went before in the art” and warning against uncertainty that
“would discourage invention only a little less than” clearly extended patent coverage). See generally
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put
Innovators at Risk (2008).
376. See supra notes 16–20, 339 and accompanying text.
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377

from the system. Further, this concern is fully addressed by the
recognition of the proper relationship between eligibility and
obviousness. Given prior-art treatment, any application that reflects
insufficient creativity in the application of science, nature, and ideas
necessarily should be found obvious and should be unpatentable. There
thus should be no theoretical error costs of excluding claims at the
threshold that should be patentable.
There should also be fewer practical error costs caused by relying on
eligibility determinations, given that these determinations are
conceptually simpler and that the prior-art status of new discoveries is
supplied by the operation of law—when the applicant discloses it—rather
than by potentially inadequate searching. Given clearer specification of
the required creativity, it will be very difficult for applicants to game the
system by hiding from their disclosures any new discoveries that underlie
the applications they claim. To do so would likely raise questions
regarding utility and enablement and might negatively impact desired
claim scope.
B. Reduced Administrative Burdens from Fewer (Inevitably
Unpatentable) Applications
Relying on eligibility determinations should, in theory, discourage
applications in excluded categories, reducing the overall volume of
applications in the patent system and thereby conserving scarce
examination resources. Similarly, clearer ex ante articulation of the
degree and kind of creativity required for “invention” should discourage
filing of insufficiently creative applications. Without such clarity,
questionable applications will continue to be filed that will ultimately be
found ineligible or unpatentable. Alternatively, they will issue as “bad
378
patents,” based either on errors of examination or on doctrinal criteria
that should be changed. There are two prominent recent examples that
highlight both sets of concerns. The first is the PTO’s recent change to
definiteness standards, which allow claims to be found invalid during
prosecution when they are susceptible to alternative reasonable
constructions, rather than when “insolubly ambiguous,” as had been the
377. Cf. Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property
Law, 55 Am. U. L. Rev. 845, 848–50 (2006) (discussing uniformity costs and the increasing need for
tailoring approaches); Duffy, supra note 11, at 613 (noting the potential for doctrinal eligibility
changes to exclude “whole fields of endeavor” while obviousness, enablement, and the doctrine of
equivalents would recognize the “marginal quality” of such claims).
378. The definition of “bad patents” is ambiguous, alternatively reflecting beliefs that such patents
should not properly have issued and beliefs that such patents properly issued but under insufficiently
rigorous patentability criteria. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley et al., What to Do About Bad Patents,
Regulation, Winter 2005–2006, at 10, 12 (noting that three-fourths of applications ultimately issue as
patents and focusing on the difficulty of proving invalidity of issued patents); id. at 12 (discussing
obtaining rights “broader than what they deserve” without explicit reference to validity).
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prior standard in prosecution and remains the standard in infringement
379
litigation. The second is the more rigorous non-obviousness doctrine
resulting from a recent Supreme Court decision, rejecting the Federal
Circuit’s more rigid and applicant/patentee-favorable “teaching,
380
suggestion, motivation” test.
There are many potential private benefits to be obtained by
applicants from erroneous patentability decisions or from uncertain
381
validity,
which often may outweigh the costs of preparing and
submitting applications. The benefits to the patent holder of acquiring
invalid, questionable, or doctrinally bad patents should pose even
broader social welfare concerns than the costs resulting from the lack of
clarity over the uncertain scope of validly granted rights, which provide
private benefits to patent holders by chilling sequential innovation and
382
competition. No meaningful sanctions exist to deter applicants from
seeking and obtaining claims to which they ultimately are not found to be
entitled. So long as they are not successfully sued—typically in the form
of counterclaims—for fraud in obtaining such claims or for having
383
affirmatively asserted claims that were known to be invalid, applicants
will retain any pre-invalidation benefits without incurring any liability
beyond the sunk costs of prosecution and maintenance. This is true even
if they are found to have engaged only in inequitable conduct when
384
obtaining the patents. Similarly, patent misuse is merely a defense, not
385
a legal claim.
Unless barred at the threshold, such erroneously granted claims will
chill innovation more broadly than will claims of uncertain scope, due to
386
their “unequivocal foreclosure of the field.” Without clearer eligibility
guidance, moreover, under the current conditions of inadequate or
uncertain search and examination, the benefits to be obtained from such
erroneously granted patents assure that they will continue to be filed.
Presumably for this reason, among others, the Supreme Court in Bilski

379. See Ex Parte Miyazaki, No. 2007-3300, 2008 WL 5105055, at *4–6 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 19, 2008)
(distinguishing Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
380. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407, 419–22 (2007) (rejecting the approach of,
for example, Al-Site Corp. v VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
381. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. Econ. Persp. 75
(2005).
382. See, e.g., supra note 375 and accompanying text; see also Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653,
668–75 (1969) (prohibiting licensee estoppel). But cf. Carroll, supra note 297, at 1425 (noting
prosecution and enforcement costs that may render the expected value of patents too low to warrant
investment in innovation or patenting).
383. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965);
Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 987–88 (9th Cir. 1979).
384. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285–87 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
385. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 38 (2006).
386. United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942).
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invited the Federal Circuit to specify narrower categories or classes of
abstract ideas—that is, clearer “rules,” although clearer “standards”
387
would also be helpful —that would provide the public with greater
388
certainty of what can qualify as eligible and what cannot. This would in
turn reduce applications for both ineligible and unpatentable claims, and
preserve or expand claims that reflect greater creativity. It would
therefore reduce administrative costs by wholly eliminating unnecessary
eligibility and patentability evaluations, and by further reducing the costs
of the eligibility and patentability determinations that remained, as the
requisite creativity or lack thereof would be more transparent from the
specification.
By providing greater clarity regarding the required kinds and
degrees of creativity, the courts would also allow for better private
ordering, which would result in better public decisionmaking and greater
system efficiency. The greater clarity around the eligibility of such claims
in turn might potentially reduce additional social costs associated with
389
private decisionmaking and transactions.
It is widely recognized that the existing patent system is
overburdened with applications that should not be filed, resulting both in
substantial processing delays and in grants that are erroneous because
they are invalid; many such patents would not issue on either eligibility
or patentability grounds if there were more and better use of search and
390
examination resources. Given the increasing number of applications
filed, and even with more resources being put into search and
examination, the problems of delay and perhaps also of quality—in the
391
sense of invalidly granted patents—are not improving. These wrongly

387. See, e.g., Chisum, supra note 51, at 30 (criticizing the Court’s limited provision of a “clue” as
an inadequate development of “tests or standards” appropriate “to resolve serious legal questions”);
Lemley et al., supra note 12, at 1316 (“The [Bilski] result was a (narrow) victory for inventors, as well
as for context-specific standards over formal rules.”). See generally Duffy, supra note 11.
388. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010).
389. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 297, at 1429 (discussing the relationships between complexity,
default property rules, and the administrative costs of licensing and litigation).
390. See, e.g., Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 Minn. J. L.
Sci. & Tech. 1, 16 (2007); see also Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examining Patent Examination,
2010 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 2, 2–3; Warren K. Mabey, Jr., Deconstructing the Patent Application Backlog,
92 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 208, 212–13 (2010). But cf. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at
the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1497 (2001) (arguing that additional search and examination
resources should not be spent on the large numbers of applications that result in patents that will
never be developed into commercial applications or asserted against third parties); see also Sarnoff,
supra note 320, at 1050–52. See generally John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on
the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1998).
391. See, e.g., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability Report:
Fiscal Year 2009–2010 tbl.1–3 (2009) (reporting a thirty-seven percent increase in filings between
2003 and 2009); John Schmid, Despite Efforts To Improve, U.S. Patent Approvals Move Slower,
Milwaukee-Wis. J. Sentinel Online, Jan. 16, 2011, http://www.jsonline.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/
113830084.html (noting that even with faster processing to supply first office actions, pending
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issued patents impose increasingly great social costs as reflected in the
392
results of reexaminations, which are exacerbated by the difficulty of
invalidating such patents in litigation in light of the heightened burdens
393
of proving invalidity.
In sum, by applying categorical exclusions more consistently and by
providing greater clarity regarding the required creativity in the
application, fewer invalid applications should be filed and fewer invalid
patents should issue. The patent system thus should be less burdened
with the wasted costs of evaluating applications, or of having to
reexamine or litigate granted patents that should have been rejected
initially on eligibility or subsequently on patentability grounds. This will
allow the limited administrative and judicial resources that exist to be
directed to search and examination, and to reexamination and litigation,
of claims that are closer to the margins of patentability. In turn, the
patent system will issue improved quality patents, providing additional
social benefits including reduction of the chills to innovation and
competition that such improperly granted patents impose.
C. Direction of Investment, Effort, Invention, and Disclosure
Towards More Creative Applications
By consistently applying the section 101 categorical exclusions and
more clearly articulating the requirement for creativity in the application,
courts and the PTO will also set the bar higher for prefiling development
of inventors’ understandings of the useful applications of newly
discovered science, nature, and ideas. This is because applicants will
likely undershoot the bar so long as the eligibility threshold remains
unclear and the private incentives continue to favor seeking patents for
insufficient creativity. Providing greater clarity thus should direct

applications exceed one million, and that number has not changed significantly in three years); see also
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It 22–30
(2009) (discussing the “patent flood,” “overburdened PTO,” continuations and reexaminations, and
“patent holdup and litigation abuse”).
392. See, e.g., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Quarterly Review: Inter Partes
Reexamination Filing Data Review (2010) (reporting that ninety-two percent of patents litigated in
inter partes reexamination proceedings are cancelled or amended); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
Quarterly Review: Ex Parte Reexamination Filing Data Review (2010) (reporting that between
seventy-seven and eighty-eight percent of patents prosecuted in ex parte reexamination proceedings
are cancelled or amended); see also Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents
35–77 (2004) (discussing erroneously issued patents and their adverse effects on innovation).
393. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Law, Business, and Economics Professors in Support
Petitioner at 1–6, 15–17, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-290). But cf.
Etan S. Chatlynne, Investigating Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity—An Empirical Analysis,
2010 Patently-O Patent L.J. 37, 43 (suggesting that the heightened evidentiary burden had relatively
little impact on a narrow sample of validity challenges for obviousness in post-KSR cases). See
generally Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 381; Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent
Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 45 (2007).
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investment, effort, invention, and disclosure towards more creative
activities, just as a higher non-obviousness threshold induces researchers
394
to address more difficult research topics. In turn, this should direct
applicants towards more socially beneficial, less obvious or analogous,
395
applications. It should also lead to more informative patent application
disclosures, which in theory should lead to more rapid and cumulatively
396
increased sequential innovation.
As has been recognized in an
international context, patent law’s requirement for inventive activity sets
a higher bar than do the corresponding levels of creativity required for
utility model protection; jurisdictions lacking such utility model
protections thus direct investment, effort, invention, and disclosures
397
towards more creative activities and applications.
Establishing a higher threshold for invention in the application, by
clarifying creativity requirements, should also force discoverers of
science, nature, and ideas to more fully develop their understanding
before claiming in patent applications that they have made creative,
patent-eligible, and patentable applications. It will thereby require a
larger “quid” from the applicant, in terms of practical and beneficial
applications, in exchange for the “quo” of exclusive rights to be obtained,
the costs of which the public must pay. There is recent precedent in the
patent system in both written-description and utility jurisprudence for
setting a higher bar for the development of patentable applications of
398
newly discovered scientific knowledge. Doing so in regard to subject
matter should be no more problematic and simultaneously should
provide the benefits, discussed above, that result from using eligibility as
a threshold inquiry.
Establishing a higher threshold for invention in the application also
should direct research and development towards activities most in need

394. See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer & Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Carrots and Sticks: A Model of
Nonobviousness, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 547, 549, 551–57 (2008).
395. Cf. Lee, supra note 23, at 663 (arguing that patents that raise the costs of “normal” science
may induce scientific paradigm shifts); Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, supra note 50, at 31 (“[P]ractical
utility’s commercialization effects are based on underlying assumptions about the value of disclosure,
exclusive rights, and simultaneous competing efforts.”).
396. See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research
and the Patent Law, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 29 (1991).
397. See, e.g., Uma Sumeransen, Utility Models and Innovation in Developing Countries xi,
16 (2006) (noting differences between patents and utility models, as well as the potential for the lower
inventive threshold for utility models to “re-direct[] funds away from innovation or marketing” and to
“cordon off areas of research”).
398. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (setting a higher bar for utility); see
also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966); cf. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
598 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (same for written description). See generally Risch, New
Uses for Patent Utility, supra note 32, at 13–17 (discussing the need to develop the practical utility of
inventions, and the effect of timing of such developed understandings on races to the patent office and
exploitation of patent prospects).
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399

of patent protection, which may not necessarily include the most
controversial areas of endeavor for patent-eligible subject-matter
determinations—for example, business methods, software, genetic
sequences, and, perhaps more debatably, medical diagnostics or
400
401
treatments. Particularly since passage of the Bayh-Dole Act —which
required universities and small businesses receiving federal funding and
seeking title to inventions to subject their employees to assignment
402
agreements —it has been argued that the patent-system incentives are
needed only for, and should apply only to, downstream product
403
development rather than to upstream scientific and natural discoveries.
And it bears noting that many forms of incentives and substantial public
funding already exist for a great deal of basic research, although
governmental contributions to research budgets have been decreasing
404
relative to private funding.

399. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 297, at 1408–10 (discussing intuitions and evidence regarding the
various types of innovation least in need of patent and copyright incentives); Carroll, supra note 297,
at 1410–22 (discussing appropriability mechanisms other than patents for incentivizing investment and
invention); see also Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) 2 (Nat’l. Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.
400. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010); Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 862–63 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative
Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3027 (2011); Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Compare, e.g., supra notes
347, 352 and accompanying text, with Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and
the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1255, 1278
(2009); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development,
3 Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity (Special Issue) 783 (1987); James E. Bessen, A Comment on
“Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?” (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper
No. 06-13, 2006); and Wesley M. Cohen et al., supra note 399.
401. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 200-211, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-3028 (1980) (codified
as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2006)).
402. See id.; Bd. of Tr. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2196–99 (2011).
403. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual Property Rights: A Reply to
Kieff, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 707, 710 (2001) (“Significant transaction costs would be likely to arise if rights
were granted in such upstream biological research as [expressed sequence tags] and single nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs) of unknown function.”); Charles McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact of the
Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research and Development: Evaluating the Arguments and Empirical
Evidence 1 (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-05-04, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1840639 (“At the heart of the debate are two
interrelated questions—1) whether granting patents on the results of ‘upstream’ genetic research
undermines the norms of the biological research community; and 2) whether such patenting promotes
or retards biomedical innovation, technology transfer, and/or the development of downstream
commercial products and processes.”). See generally Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 L. & Contemp. Probs. 289 (2003).
404. See, e.g., John Boswell & James R. Myers, Automated Analysis of the Patent Landscape,
21 ACCA Docket 72, 87 (2003) (“From 1994 to 2000, private industry increases in R&D funding
fueled the largest real rise in history in U.S. expenditures on R&D.”); Patrick J. Clemins, Historical
Trends in Federal R&D, in AAAS Report XXXIV: Research and Development FY 2010, at 25 (Am.
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These concerns have repeatedly manifested themselves in the
biotechnology context, raising serious concerns about upstream patents
that discourage cumulative innovation and simultaneously raising serious
concerns about changes to the normative belief structures and values that
405
underlie the public domain treatment of science, nature, and ideas. But
they exist also in regard to business methods and software, for which
categorical exclusions would likely drive the patent system away from
basic and upstream research, such as the development of algorithms with
broad applications, and towards downstream product and process
406
development.
Given the prior-art treatment of the fruits of such basic research,
changing the default rules for eligibility in the patent system may impose
serious costs on sequential innovation and product development, as well
as on public access to and the price of important technologies. For one of
the most salient current examples, in the Myriad Genetics case, an
international consortium was in the process of sequencing the breast
cancer genome. The gene would have been placed into the public domain
but for the efforts of Mark Skolnick, who employed access to Mormon
genealogical records and Utah public health records and used federal
funds and researcher assistance to more quickly locate the gene and then
407
sequence it. But the location of the gene is clearly a natural phenomenon
Assoc. for the Advancement of Science 2010) (noting recent expenditures bringing research funding as
compared to gross domestic product back to historic averages); Michael Yamaner, Federal R&D
Support Shows Little Change in FY 2008, Nat’l Sci. Found. Info Brief 09-320, Sept. 2009 tbl.1
(showing that federal R&D spending in year 2000 constant dollars has increased slightly since 1990,
peaking in 2005); cf. Carroll, supra note 297, at 1368 (noting various alternatives for funding creativity,
including “indirect subsidies through tax expenditure or market regulation through other tax policies,
or direct spending on innovation either through direct employment or through a system of grants,
rewards or prizes for creators and inventors”).
405. Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Arti K. Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the Benefits of StateSponsored Research: Intellectual Property Rights and Data Sharing in California’s Stem Cell Initiative,
21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1187, 1200 (2006) (discussing concerns over restrictions on data and materials
transfers). But see, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and
the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 691 (2001). See generally
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in
Government-Sponsored Research, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1663 (1996); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary
Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 Yale L.J. 177 (1987); Arti K. Rai,
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 77 (1999); Rai, supra note 403.
406. See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, supra note 375, at 201 (“T]he abstractness of software technology
inherently makes it more difficult to place limits on abstract claims in software patents.”); id. at 203
(“Patent law assumes that two technologies can be unambiguously determined to be equivalent or
distinct . . . . Yet for software, this assumption simply does not hold. . . . Of course, not all software
patents cover algorithms. Some are quite specific and limited in what they claim.”).
407. See, e.g., Jordan Paradise, European Opposition to Exclusive Control over Predictive Breast
Cancer Testing and the Inherent Implications for U.S. Patent Law and Public Policy: A Case Study of
the Myriad Genetics’ BRCA Patent Controversy, 59 Food & Drug L.J. 133, 143–44 (2004); Bryn
Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and Application of Commercial
BRCA Testing, 10 Health L.J. 123, 131 (2002); Phyllida Brown & Kurt Kleiner, Patent Row Splits
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(a medical fact), and once treated as prior art no creativity, particularly
given the advanced state of genetic technologies, went into isolating the
408
DNA for the gene or identifying its sequence. And even if it were
treated it as an eligible invention, the prior-art status of the information
about location and sequence should have made the claim obvious and
unpatentable, just as the “lead compound” approach using routine
methods to identify the gene’s function makes pharmaceutical claims
409
obvious and unpatentable. As argued by various medical organizations
and patient group amici, and as vigorously disputed by various
biotechnology industry amici, these patents on the immensely important
and publicly salient breast cancer gene should never have issued and
debatably have resulted in large—and wholly avoidable—monetary,
410
health, and innovation costs to the public. Seeking to affirmatively
authorize such patents by eliminating the categorical exclusions or their
prior-art status would dramatically expand such controversies.
D. Utilitarian and Deontological Risks of Changing the Current
Approach
The most significant argument against the categorical eligibility of
such basic discoveries is the arguable overbreadth in regard to potentially
discouraging investment and effort in discovering and disclosing science,
nature, ideas, particularly given the lack of adequate governmental
411
resources in tough economic times to fund basic research. But this
Breast Cancer Researchers, New Scientist, Sept. 1994, at 4, 4.
408. Cf. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978). (“If we assume that that method was also
known, as we must under the reasoning in Morse, then respondent’s claim is, in effect, comparable to a
claim that the formula 2Βr can be usefully applied in determining the circumference of a wheel.”). See
generally Joseph Sambrook & David W. Russell, Molecular Cloning: A Laboratory Manual (3d
ed. 2001).
409. See, e.g., Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Matrix Labs., Ltd., 619 F.3d 1346, 1352–54 (Fed. Cir.
2010); Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999, 1006–09 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Eisai
Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
410. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 206–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(reciting the competing allegations without finding the facts), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2011). Compare Brief for Amici Curiae Am. Med. Ass’n. et al. in Support of Plaintiffs’
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment at 22–24, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (No. 09 Civ. 4515); Brief for
Amici Curiae March of Dimes Found. et al. in Support of Plaintiffs at 17–25, Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (No. 09 Civ. 4515); and Brief for Am. Med. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Arguing for Affirmance at 2–12, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406), with Brief Amicus Curiae Biotech. Indus.
Org. in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 18–27,
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (No. 09 Civ. 4515); Brief of Amicus Curiae
Genetic Alliance in Opposition to Certain Positions of the Plaintiffs at 22–25, Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (No. 09 Civ. 4515); and Brief for Biotech. Indus. Org. and the Ass’n of
Univ. Tech. Managers as Amici Curiae Supporting Reversal at 20–32, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology,
653 F.3d 1329 (No. 2010-1406).
411. See, e.g., Paul R. Michel, Leading Citizens: Lead Congress so Congress Will Lead Your

Sarnoff_24 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

122

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

12/5/2011 11:32 PM

[Vol. 63:53

concern is addressed by the historical practice and underlying reasons for
protecting and preserving the public domain of science, nature, and ideas
free from patent rights, and thus for requiring sufficient creativity in their
412
application. Society has made the decision that basic research and
development—however paid for—should remain “free to all men and
413
reserved exclusively to none,” which is the common refrain in patent
eligibility cases involving new discoveries.
Further, in the context of whether to grant private rights for publicly
funded invention, the argument has been made that patents are most
needed for downstream product development and not for upstream
414
research and development.
Eliminating upstream restrictions on
eligibility by eliminating the categorical exclusions and removing the
requirement for eligibility in their application would raise even more
strongly the anticommons, holdup, and related concerns for follow-on
research and innovation, both basic and applied. Changing the current,
default approach to the eligibility of categorically excluding science,
nature, and ideas and of treating them as prior art is thus a very high-risk
innovation-policy strategy. And it would likely cause even more serious
changes to the scientific norms than those that have taken place since
415
enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act. As those norms change further,
public resistance to treating discoveries as categorically excluded may
also weaken.
Nevertheless, deontological moral norms against subjecting science,
nature, and ideas to private, patent property rights remain strong, and
proposing to eliminate the categorical exclusions or their prior-art status
would generate controversies best avoided. These controversies are
currently apparent in the political realm, where morality can more
readily be discussed and legislated, in regard to the expansion of the
patent system to new fields of endeavor such as cloned organisms and tax

Country, 20 Fed. Cir. B.J. 265, 265–66 (2010) (“Increased public financing for increased investment in
innovation, however, will be hard to find. Public finance has been nearly exhausted by the cost of two
concurrent and continuing wars and a decade of fiscal mismanagement, saddling us with a huge annual
debt payment and annual budget deficits of hundreds of billions of dollars. In this recession when tax
revenues are down, obtaining even a modest increase in public research and development (‘R&D’)
funding will be politically difficult, if not impossible. Actually, the challenge will be to avoid cuts in
government R&D funding.”); cf. Lemley, et al., supra note 12, at 1326 (“The core mission of patent
law is to create incentives for the production, disclosure, and commercialization of socially valuable
inventions.”).
412. See supra notes 271–301 and accompanying text.
413. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
414. See supra note 403 and accompanying text.
415. See Joshua D. Sarnoff & Christopher M. Holman, Recent Developments Affecting the
Enforcement, Procurement, and Licensing of Research Tool Patents, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1299,
1320–27 (2008) (discussing studies of changes to scientists’ research practices based on changes in the
patent system); supra notes 403, 405 and accompanying text.
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416

strategies. In the case of extension of the patent system to medical and
surgical methods of diagnosis and treatment, advocates for expansion
won the eligibility battle but lost the rights war, at least in the United
States, as Congress limited the scope of infringement liability to avoid
subjecting medical practitioners and their institutions to the
417
consequences of granting any such patents.
These normative disputes over extending the patent system will be
even more polarizing when created by judicial decisions, particularly as
there may be a one-way ratchet effect: Congress may not be able to
retrospectively reverse the effects of the court decisions that extend
418
eligibility without potentially generating takings liability, which may
further undermine the political ability of opponents of the court decision
to obtain legislation that does so. In contrast, Congress can readily
extend eligibility prospectively or retrospectively where the courts have
419
restricted it, without creating a taking, although some constitutional
question remains regarding whether particular inventions that have
entered the public domain as a result of the restriction can again receive
420
protection. Given the long time frames for patents (though they are
421
shorter than those for copyrights), future beneficiaries of restoring
earlier limits to eligibility are less likely to come forward to engage in the
legislative or judicial arenas. In turn, this one-way ratchet effect of
retrospective legislative repeal only of judicial restrictions tends to
promote uncertainty and continuing expansion of the patent system
422
rather than the stability of eligibility doctrine.
416. See supra notes 56, 57 and accompanying text.
417. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006). Lacking a sufficiently powerful and organized lobby, patients
(that is, the entire general public) remain potentially liable. Most of the rest of the world simply
excludes such claims from eligibility. See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra
note 198, at art. 53(c) (creating an exception to patentability that prohibits the grant of a patent, rather
than creating an exclusion from the definition of invention). Nevertheless, patients themselves are not
covered, and indirect liability may still give such patents force (and raise First Amendment free speech
concerns). Cf. Brief Amicus Curiae of AARP in Support of Petitioner at 7–8, Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (No. 04-607); Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech,
79 Tex. L. Rev. 99, 115–17, 136–54 (2000).
418. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
419. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602–04
(2010) (discussing judicial takings).
420. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011).
Compare Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Congress may not authorize the issuance
of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free
access to materials already available.”), with Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 203 (2002) (noting, in
the context of extending the term of subsisting copyrights, that the validity of issued patents may
depend on retrospective legislation, and citing McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843),
which had upheld the validity of a patent that was invalid under the law at the time of its grant but
validated by subsequent legislation).
421. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006), with 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
422. Cf. Duffy, supra note 11, at 613–14 (discussing the benefits of less clear but more durable
approaches to eligibility, given the need for doctrinal stability over the two-decade time frame of
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Finally, controversies over the morality of the patent system’s
application to controversial subject matter may tend to bring the patent
system into disrepute, notwithstanding its less controversial benefits. This
would detract from the ability to acquire sufficient government funds and
adequately trained personnel to manage the many needs that already
exist within the system. Thus, avoiding dramatic changes to eligibility
doctrine should help to improve the patent system’s function and to
generate greater consensus over the benefits that it may provide. To the
extent that proponents of expansion ultimately wish to be successful,
they may be better off treading slowly and hoping that the normative
shifts away from protecting the public domain will make the hoped-for
transition more feasible and less controversial at some time in the future.
It may be impossible to demonstrate theoretically and empirically
that the historical approach is a better innovation and moral policy than
is limiting eligibility doctrine and permitting patents on uncreative,
limited applications of newly discovered science, nature, and ideas—or
than is congressionally or judicially legislating eligibility criteria out of
existence. But the burden of proof is on advocates of change. As Fritz
Machlup noted over fifty years ago, given that this approach has been
our practice it would be irresponsible to propose changing it without
more evidence to support the change, as much as if it had not been our
423
practice it would be irresponsible to propose adopting it.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos has placed continued
emphasis and required greater focus on patentable subject-matter
424
eligibility, and we will continue to flounder unless and until a coherent
theory is provided for why eligibility matters and what eligibility doctrine
is really about. The Federal Circuit, in Research Corporation Technologies,
and various scholars have articulated their reluctance to use patentable
425
subject-matter eligibility doctrines to restrict access to the patent system.
For the many reasons discussed above, this reluctance is unjustified so long
as we continue to believe in a robust public domain of science, nature, and
ideas and seek to protect it from encroachment by requiring additional and
different creativity as the quid pro quo for entry into the patent system.
It is the more fundamental question of whether to have and to
protect such a public domain at all, and the strong views that are held on
that issue, that actually generate the heat surrounding the narrower,
doctrinal, patentable subject-matter eligibility issues. Although
issued patents).
423. Machlup, supra note 61, at 80.
424. See 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
425. See Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, (Fed. Cir. 2010); supra notes
11–15 and accompanying text.
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theoretically ambiguous, our history and legal doctrine continue to
reflect strong commitments to the public domain of science, nature, and
ideas. In contrast, our current normative and political beliefs appear less
certain and more polarized regarding whether to continue with these
426
commitments. Given the long-standing and controversial history of
427
private property encroachments on the commons, it should be no
surprise that eligibility disputes are both contested and hot.
Restricting eligibility doctrine and lowering the creative threshold
are correctly perceived as attacks on the public domain and to those
historic beliefs. Wholly eliminating reliance on patentable subject-matter
eligibility, moreover, would represent a scorched-earth strategy,
particularly if combined with efforts to eliminate the prior-art treatment
of science, nature, and ideas from patentability evaluations as well as
428
from eligibility determinations. Conversely, to those who believe in
using private property to motivate creative advance, using eligibility
determinations to restrict access to the patent system is the bomb that
429
threatens our future viability. For the reasons discussed above, I
430
believe we need to learn to stop worrying and to love that bomb.

426. See Kieff, supra note 405, at 695 (“[T]he breakdown in prescriptive norms that Rai attributes
to patents in the post-1980 basic biological research community actually occurred well before 1980 as a
result of several factors other than patents, which were largely unavailable in that community before
1980.”); supra note 426 and accompanying text.
427. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 33, 33–36 (2003) (discussing the historic enclosure of the public
domain in land commons); id. at 40 (“Once again, the critics and proponents of enclosure are locked in
battle, hurling at each other incommensurable claims about innovation, efficiency, traditional values,
the boundaries of the market, the saving of lives, the loss of familiar liberties. Once again, opposition
to enclosure is portrayed as economically illiterate . . . .”). See generally James Boyle, The Public
Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind (2008).
428. Cf. Boyle, supra note 427, at 52 (“Like the environment, the public domain must be ‘invented’
before it is saved.”).
429. Cf. Risch, Everything Is Patentable, supra note 14, at 658 (comparing eligibility exclusions to a
“machete” that “eliminat[es] broad swaths of innovation,” while patentability criteria are a “scalpel”).
430. See Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (Columbia
Pictures 1964) (with apologies).
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